"As I Have Loved You"
Chapter Seven
Perspectives in Christian Ethics Examined
In light of the Scriptural studies of the last five chapters, several significant approaches to ethics will now be examined. Full justice cannot be done to the positions represented, but crucial aspects will be isolated that either heighten or detract from the centrality of Christ in Christian obedience.
In working through this historical material, it will become apparent that traditional "Christian" ethics has focused more on the old covenant and Moses than on the new covenant and Christ. Further, traditional views have manifested almost no sensitivity to the importance of redemptive-historical considerations. This has resulted in what might be called a "flat Bible" approach to Christian ethics.
Why has Traditional "Christian" Ethics
been Old Covenant Oriented?
It can be observed that the idea of "Christian obedience" from the fourth century onwards was rooted more in the old covenant than in the new. There are several contributing factors as to why this was the case, but one of the central reasons was the radical change that took place when Constantine became Emperor of the Roman Empire. The idea of a "Christian society" began when Constantine made Christianity the religion of the Empire.1
As time went on, a theocratic mind-set was embedded in the thought of the church. Obviously, such a vision could not be found in the New Testament. Naturally, then, the foundations for "Christian states" were discovered in the Old Testament.2 Since the entire fabric of life in "Christian states" was couched in theocratic presuppositions, it is no surprise that the general approach to ethics was informed by the old covenant.
Anabaptist Perspective: Martin
Luther vs. Menno Simons
For whatever reasons, the Anabaptists grasped the fact that a new covenant had taken the place of an old one. 3 Their ethic was rooted in the person and work of Christ. This perspective brought them to reject "Christian states" which, among other things, employed the sword to defend the Christian faith. Likewise, it created a vision for a believing church in the place of the traditional territorial church. 4
The Reformers had virtually identified the old and new covenants, 5 and the Anabaptists strongly reacted to this. They maintained that the new covenant was superior to the old. In fact, many Anabaptists so separated the old and new covenants that they denied the possibility of salvation before Christ came.6
Because of their radical dichotomy of the old and new covenants, the Anabaptists had to deal with how to use the Old Testament. It cannot be stated with fairness that the Anabaptists neglected the Old Testament, but their use of it manifests a tendency to spiritualize and moralize its contents.7
Martin Luther vs. Menno Simons. While Luther saw the Law coming to men in the Gospel, Menno saw the Law as coming prior to the Gospel, to effect repentance, and from that point on "the Gospel comes to give comfort."8 They both held that the Law had to come. The difference was only in methodology.
As it was observed in Chapter Six, 9 there is no indication in the New Testament that there is a Law-then-gospel or Law-in-Gospel approach to evangelism. This approach of Luther and Menno wrongly turns a redemptive-historical shift from Law to Gospel (John 1:17) into a subjective progression of Law-then-Gospel in conversion.
In relation to Law-Gospel functions, both Luther and Menno follow the traditional pattern of viewing the Law as "threat and command," and the Gospel as "promise and comfort."10 While there is some truth behind this formula, it again denudes Law and Gospel of their redemptive-historical import. Further, this formula, if followed with consistency, results in the strained idea that there is no promise in Law or no command in the Gospel. For example, Herman Witsius, one of the original formulators of Covenant Theology, said: "All prescription of duty belongs to the law . . . . The promises of grace [must] be referred to the gospel, all injunctions of duty to the law." 11 Only by maintaining sensitivity to redemptive history can the following Biblical propositions be upheld: (1) there was promise in the Law; (2) the Gospel commands duty; and (3) Law and Gospel must not be fused together.
With respect to Law and Gospel in the Christian life, Luther and Menno differed more significantly. "For Luther, the commands of the New Testament are not the Gospel, but the Law in the Gospel. For Menno, the New Testament commands are an integral part of the Gospel."12 Hence, Menno saw the Gospel as the rule of life for the believer, and viewed the Law as abrogated in Christ's fulfillment. But for Luther the Gospel "is always the promise of forgiveness, and never a demand."13 The moral imperative for the believer must always be located in the Law and not the Gospel. This approach, however, does no justice to the pattern of redemptive-history. Just as the Egyptian exodus was the basis of the "command" in Exodus 20, so the exodus of Christ in the fullness of time forms the basis of "command" in the new covenant (John 13:31-35).
In many ways the Anabaptists were far ahead of their times. 14 They saw that there were indeed ethical implications flowing out of the person and work of Christ, especially in the Sermon on the Mount; they saw that the New Testament distinguishes, and does not fuse together, the old and new covenants; and they saw that the theocracy was part of an old age, and that the church was comprised of disciples.
Of course, they had their faults. But church history has only in the last twenty years begun to recognize the Anabaptists' singular contribution to the realization of the liberties which we take for granted. And, in the realm of ethics, their basic approach provided the rudiments upon which a New Testament perspective could be built.
Reformation Perspective:
John Calvin
Although the Reformation broke away from many of the false doctrines and practices of Romanism, it retained the 1,200 year tradition of state churches. Hence, the Reformation ethic continued to be oriented around the old covenant. This was tragic for while it was within Protestantism that ethics became a "distinguishable and systematic discipline,"15 it was among the Anabaptists that an ethic rooted in the cross was espoused.
One of the reasons why Calvin's ethic was rooted in the old covenant was because of a flattening of redemptive history which resulted in no progression from old to new.
Helmut Thielicke makes the significant observation that Calvin's fusion of law and gospel leads to an a-historical tendency in Calvinism. Thielicke points out that it is imperative for us to root the love of God in salvation history, 16 and sees a threat to this when law and gospel "are regarded as two sides of the same thing."17
Karl Barth, of course, is the epitome of a theology which manifests a non-concern for history. In his scheme, "there is no movement of saving history from the Old Testament to the New."18
There is no qualitative difference between the two Testaments, only a distinction in the manner in which salvation is dispensed and offered, namely the distinction taken over from Calvin between the "mode of administration" and the "substance" of salvation.19
Of course, in many ways Calvin and Barth are not on the same wave lengths. But Thielicke is simply pointing out how important it is to distinguish law and gospel, which Luther accomplishes to a greater degree than Calvin.20 But is it not significant that in Calvin "we have at least the germ" of an unhistorical approach? 21 And what is at the root of this tendency?
For Calvin, there is basically only one covenant in many varied forms . . . . There is thus an implied identity of the two Testaments . . . . For Calvin the new covenant does not really introduce anything new. . . . The new covenant does not involve a historical turning point . . . . Even when Calvin quotes passages from Scripture which tell us that the Law preaches death and condemnation while the Gospel preaches life and righteousness, and that Law is abolished while the Gospel remains, he changes the obvious qualitative distinction between Law and Gospel into a quantitative one . . . . The result is that in the Calvinist tradition there is an unhistorical trend which leads finally to the extreme of relating Old and New Testaments in the fashion of two concentric circles. 22
This is why we must emphasize: (1) the obvious historicity of the Biblical covenants; (2) the obvious a-historicity of the "covenant of grace" as unfolded in Covenant Theology; and (3) the obvious historical turning point which occurred in the incarnation of Christ.
A Lutheran Perspective:
Helmut Thielicke
The first volume of Thielicke's Theological Ethics ("Foundations") indicates a sensitivity to redemptive history, 23 and presents many pertinent insights. Here, his development of the believer as both under law and not under law will be considered.
Thielicke sees "justification as the presupposition of evangelical ethics."24 Later, he comes to consider the work of Christ and its centrality in our obedience.
Not under Law. Thielicke observes that in the area of redemption,
the zone in which man is here addressed lies wholly outside the.dominion of the law. If I must be commanded by the law, this is a sign that I am not yet "free," that I have not yet died and risen again with Christ, that I do not yet have the spontaneity of the new existence . . . love, joy, peace, etc. are understood as necessary and automatic expressions of the gracious event which has broken through into the life of believers.25
This spontaneity
is possible only if the Law has no part in the origin of this total movement . . . . This movement devoid of Law and imperative is possible only in love . . . . Thus, it is not the Law but the Gospel alone which can release that love . . . . The love which actualizes itself in good works is really posited in and with the love of God which is shown to us. In order to come into being it needs no supplementary intervention on the part of the Law.26
Does this perspective, then, lead us to confess that "a legal imperative would seem to be completely out of the question?"27 Absolutely not. But the question at issue is, how are we to conceive of the commandments which direct us under the new covenant? Thielicke asks, "Is the gift (of Christ] not sufficiently powerful and effective to assert itself in the new existence?"28 Yes, it is. And the beautiful thing is that the commandment to love flows out of the gift (John 15:12-13)! Or, we could say it this way--the gift commands us!
But, unfortunately, Thielicke locates the primary "imperative" in the Ten Commandments (p. 72), and not in the "new commandment."
Nevertheless, he wishes to uphold the priority of the gospel in the imperative of ethics. He emphasizes how important it is to find
the right starting point, on the basis of which, once it has been attained, everything else will flow naturally of itself . . . . In other words, the crucial thing . . .is that we should drink from the right source.29
And this Source is, of course, our meat and drink, Jesus Christ (John 6:53-57). Summarizing, Thielicke says:
The purpose of the imperative is not to intrude upon the automatic process and so declare that justification of itself is incapable of producing the "new creation." On the contrary, the imperative is rather a demand that we should attain to that starting point where the automatic process goes into operation. 30
Under law. Thielicke, like Luther, sees the Christian as a "stone lying in the sun, which need not be commanded to become warm."31 But even in this state, because he is not yet glorified, the warmed stone is in need of exhortation, spiritual growth, and maturity.32
Therefore, Thielicke believes that the Christian needs "flashing red lights on both sides of the path" (the Decalogue). 33 He uses another analogy: "the Law is a kind of sheep dog whose purpose is to recall the members of the flock to the path of the shepherd."34 Thus, he contends, "the Law is necessary in the Christian life to remind us that all spheres are to be related to our sonship." 35
There are several problems with this rationale, problems which arise out of Scripture and out of his own sentiments. First, in the sheep dog illustration something radically foreign to John 10 is introduced by Thielicke. The sheep, according to Jesus the Shepherd, "hear His voice and follow Him." It is not the voice of a sheep dog (the law) they hear, but Him. There is apparently no need for a supplemental voice. Christ's voice is sufficient to guide the sheep.
Secondly, Thielicke states that Christian progress, or "sanctification," "consists in my allowing the resurrection of Christ into which I have been drawn, to take place in me--in the form of a new life and through my own affirmation Of it." 36 Where is the centrality of the Law in this statement?
Thirdly, why is the-law contemplated as the source that can relate all areas of life to our sonship? Have we not seen from the New Testament that all relationships-marriage, church, work-are all related to Christ's love? Is the gospel not able to inform us of the many-sided outworkings of our sonship in Christ? Thielicke seems to deny here what he affirms elsewhere: "the love which actualizes itself in good works . . . needs no supplementary intervention on the part of the Law."37
Motivation in Christian ethics. Thielicke points out that in Christian ethics it is impossible and wrong to compile a manual which can give "advance decisions" for all cases that may arise. This is so, he says, because
such advance decisions are possible only within a framework of a "legalistic" rather than an "evangelical" view of things. The view would be "legalistic" to the extent that it does not let the man be the acting subject in the making of his decision. He becomes merely the object, agent, or executor of a decision which has been made already by others, e.g., those in authority . . . . It is a characteristic feature of legalism that it does not let a man be a subject. Instead it impels him "from without," and thus makes him the object of this impulsion from outside himself . . . . The only obedience which is whole and undivided, and in which the ego has the significance of an acting subject wholly committed to its action, is love.38
All of this has something to say about the Puritan pastor and his giving solutions to multitudes of "cases of conscience." Huge tomes were produced in Puritanism where numerous "cases" are set forth and "resolved." This appears to parallel the Rabbinic approach to ethics, "elaborating the will of God as much as possible and in carrying on a casuistry that extended like a net over all of life."39
"Those in authority" in Puritanism were the pastors, and "the cure of afflicted consciences" and "now committed to ministers of the gospel."40 The attempt was made in Puritanism
to build up an all-inclusive theoretical and practical theology, in which there was no attempt made to bypass any of the thorny problems which arise when one tries to apply the Christian ethic to the multifarious situations of daily life.41
Perkins' Whole Treatise of Cases of Conscience (1606) became a "kind of popular health manual for the soul," and gave specific directives even for "the small issues of conduct."42
This approach is old covenant oriented (Gal. 3:24-25; 4:1-3), treats Christians like little children, and does not do justice to the spirit of New Testament ethics.
The Puritan Perspective:
Thomas Watson
The most obvious thing about Watson's approach to Christian duty is that he assumes that ethical fullness is to be found only in the Ten Commandments. Rather than starting with the redemptive event of the new covenant (the cross), he begins with the old exodus from Egypt. Instead of beginning with "as I have loved you," he begins with "I have brought you out of Egypt." To be sure, the latter exodus is typical of a future exodus, but Watson makes it normative. This points to the basic old covenant orientation of Puritanism.
Watson asserts that obedience to the Ten Commandments is the Christian's rule of life. He believes that "obedience [to it] must be in and through Christ."43 However, is this the approach of the New Testament? In terms of starting point, does the New Testament point the believer to duties flowing out of the new exodus, or just refer him back to Exod. 20? In light of the advance of redemptive history, is it not mandatory to begin with the "new commandment" which is connected to the new covenant blood?
"Do this and live." Another problem which surfaces is that since the Puritans viewed law strictly in terms of the Decalogue, there was a tendency to structure the gospel in terms of "do this and live." Obviously, their desire was to maintain the freeness of grace apart from works. But the formula that often comes across is "if obedience, then blessing," which is the legal principle of the Mosaic covenant. For example, Watson says,
what are the great arguments or incentives to obedience? (1) Obedience makes us precious to God, his favorites . . . . Would we have a blessing in our estates? . . . To obey is the best way to thrive in our estates (Deut. 28:1, 3, 5).44
Does the New Testament teach that we are made precious to God by our obedience, or that we are precious to Him because we are "accepted in the Beloved"?
In his section on "Love" (pp. 6-12), Watson sees the sum of the Decalogue as "love to God and neighbor," but he never discusses the "new commandment" to love one another, and only on two brief occasions mentions love as related to Christ's work.45 Does this reflect sensitivity to the New Testament emphasis as found in I John 3:16, 4:9-11?
When dealing with the preface to the Ten Commandments (Exod. 20:1-2), Watson says that "all these words" refers to the "moral law," which is "the rule of life and manners . . . . Though the moral law be not a Christ to justify us," he says, "it is a rule to instruct us." 46 This implies that we need Christ to justify us, but we do not need Christ to instruct us, for all the instruction we need is in the Decalogue. But, as we have seen, the New Testament makes it clear that the person of Christ, is the starting point of instruction in all areas of life.
The law as hedge. Further, Watson sees the law of God "as a hedge to keep us within the bounds of sobriety and piety.47 But is it the case that those who are "sons" need the law as a "hedge"? Was the law not designed as a "hedge" for Israel until the coming of Christ (Gal. 3:25; 4:2)? This whole approach to law in the Christian life does not do justice to the status of believers as "new creations" who are not debtors to live after the flesh because they are "under grace" (Gal. 6:15; Rom. 8:12; 6:14). Paul did not' approach believers as if they were little children who needed all kinds of "hedges." Rather, he had confidence that God was at work in Christians (Phil. 1:6). Paul fears for the Galatians because they observe days, and have come under beggarly elements (4:10-11). But, in the midst of all their serious problems, Paul expresses hope: "I have confidence in you through the Lord, that you will adopt no other view" (5:10). In II Thess. 3:4, Paul says, "we have confidence in the Lord touching you, that you both do and will do the things which we command you." Likewise, Paul can write to Philemon: "Having confidence in your obedience I wrote to you, knowing that you will also do more than I say" (v. 21).
The way the New Testament approaches duty is through the "law of Christ," which is love. Christians are exhorted as responsible people who are expected to do the right things because they are sheep tuned into Christ's voice. And in these exhortations, the dying of Christ is the sufficient incentive. This "hedge" approach implies that if you leave Christians alone there is no telling what they will do. But Paul's approach is otherwise.
In Paul's letters . . . the presumption is that Christians will grow and develop in faith and character. They should become more able to make correct moral decisions, they must learn to discern what is important and what is not, and they are expected to develop in character as Christians. 48
Can the law "sanctify"? "We say not," says Watson,
that he (the believer) is under the curse of the law, but the commands. We say not the moral law is a Christ, but it is a star to lead to Christ. We say not that it saves, but sanctifies.49
To teach that the law is capable of sanctifying a believer is a dangerous notion, but nevertheless consistent with such emphasis on the centrality of law. Just how does a believer escape the curse of the law in justification, yet remain under its full dominion in sanctification?
Not under law, but under law. This tension of the Christian being unable to fully obey the law, yet being required to obey it fully as a rule of life, is explained by Watson in the following way:
In a true gospel-sense, we may so obey the moral law as to find acceptance. This gospel obedience consists in a real endeavor to observe he whole moral law. "I have done thy commandments" (Ps. 119:166); not, I have done all I should do, but I have done all I am able to do; and wherein my obedience comes short, I look up to the perfect righteousness and obedience of Christ, and hope for pardon through his blood. This is to obey the moral law evangelically; which, though it be not to satisfaction, yet it is to acceptation . . . though we cannot, by our own strength, fulfill all these commandments, yet doing quoad pose , what we are able, the Lord has provided encouragement for us . . . . (2) Though we cannot exactly fulfill the moral law, yet God for Christ's sake will mitigate the rigor of the law, and accept of something less than he requires. God in the law requires exact obedience, yet will accept of sincere obedience; he will abate something of the degree, if there be truth in the inward parts. He will see the faith, and pass by the failing. The gospel remits the severity of the moral law.50
The idea that the gospel waters down the rigor of the law is erroneous. Rather, it appears that Watson is driven to reduce the demand of the law under the gospel in order to maintain it as a rule of life for Christians. Paul saw in the same law a curse upon those who did not totally obey (Gal. 3:10; Deut. 27:26).
This tension can be resolved only as we approach the law "in Christ." Our "rule," or canon, must begin with the redemption of Christ and the pervasive ethical demand which flows out of it. Christians, by marriage to Christ, have been released from the law, in order that they might bring forth fruit to God in newness of Spirit (Rom. 7:4-6). It is only as we come to grips with our not-under-law, but under grace status in Christ that we can properly understand why sin no longer lords it over us (Rom. 6:14). It is only in this way that we can do full justice to both the absolute rigor of the law, and our freedom in the gospel from it. In the gospel, we are not, as Watson suggests, justified without the law, and then sanctified by it. No, we are justified by faith in Christ, and then we live by faith in the Son of God. Is the Christian, then, in a "lawless" condition? Absolutely not. He is under the yoke of Christ (Matt. 11:29-30); he is in-law to Christ (I Cor. 9:21); he fulfills the "law of Christ" (Gal. 6:2). Thus, as even Ernest Kevan admits, "grace is more commanding than law!"51 If this be the case, why do we not concentrate on Christ, on newness of life in Him, and the gracious demand that He makes on our living?
Built-in frustration. Watson's ethical perspective brings with it built-in frustration. The believer is asked to learn the "hard lesson to live above the law, yet walk according to the law . . . to walk in the law in respect of duty, but to live above it in respect of comfort."52 Marriage to Christ brings with it a new relationship; and in this relationship we are to derive our comfort, our duty, our everything from Christ--our Husband, our Bread of Life, our Vine, our Prophet. If we focus on anyone or anything other than Christ we run the risk of missing everything important. And we must ask ourselves these questions: Does the new commandment to love, as Christ loved us, leave us with little to perform? Is there so little here that we must look elsewhere for a comprehensive ethical starting point? Why is it that in most books dealing with Christian ethics, virtually no attention is given to the infinite demand found in the new commandment? Why do we suppose that ethical fullness is found only in Exod. 20?
Sermon on the Mount. Perhaps the reply to the last question would be: because our Lord found ethical fullness in the Decalogue, as is evidenced in His Sermon on the Mount. In Matt. 5:21-48 we find the Lord citing some of the Ten Commandments, and other commands from the Old Testament. This certainly indicates its ethical profitableness. However, what important fact clearly emerges at the conclusion of this sermon? The One who spoke all these words possessed "authority" (Matt. 7:28-29), and directed men, in terms of a starting point, to His sayings (Matt. 7:24, 26). This substantiates the point that Moses is approached through Christ, and, in terms of searching for a law-giver, we are directed by our Lord's own statements to Him as the One having the words of eternal life (John 6:68; Acts 3:22). All of this indicates that while Moses is not discarded as irrelevant, his "glory" cannot be compared to that of Christ (II Cor. 3:7-11).
Romans 8:4. This brings up another question. Is not the goal of redemption in Christ to see the "righteousness of the law" come to expression in our lives? But what exactly is the "righteousness of the law?" Paul could have easily stated that the goal was that the law might be fulfilled in us. But does the law not testify to a righteousness, to something beyond itself? "The law is therefore not so significant as the fundamental principles which it embodies."53 Are not the two great commandments found elsewhere than the Decalogue, but certainly in the Old Testament (Lev. 19:18; Deut. 6:5)? Cannot Jesus summarily state that the whole law hangs on these two broad commandments, and that everything in the Law and Prophets can be comprehended in the broad principle of "whatever you would that men should do to you, do even so to them" (Matt. 7:12; Luke 6:31)? And is all of this not summed up in the single commandment to love? Our love to God and neighbor is now determined and conditioned by the loving act of God in sending Christ (John 3:16). We love because He first loved us in Christ (I John 4:19). It is only with this perspective that we can understand how believers can actually perform a righteousness which "exceeds" that of the Scribes and Pharisees (Matt. 7:20). The law absolutely fails to bring righteous living. Rather, it stirs up sin (Rom. 8:3; 7:8). It is only released from the law by marriage to Christ that the righteousness of the law can be fulfilled in those who walk in the Spirit (Rom. 6:14, 18; 8:4; Gal. 5:16, 18).
England a "New Israel." Another significant belief that flows out of Watson's understanding of law is that he sees England as an "Israel." Thus, he can justify the use of the sword in "standing for Christ":
In former times the nobles of Polonia, when the gospel was read, laid their hands upon their swords, signifying that they were ready to defend the faith, and hazard their lives for the gospel.54
When discussing the blessing of being "delivered from places of idolatry," he rejoices in
the goodness of God to our nation (England), in bringing us out of mystic Egypt, delivering us from popery . . . . Oh! what cause we have to bless God for delivering us from popery! It was a mercy to be delivered from the Spanish invasion and the powder treason; but it is far greater to be delivered from the popish religion, which would have made God give us a bill of divorce.55
He conceives of God as being married to England (as God was a husband to Israel), and that the wrong state-religion would cause God to "divorce" Watson's homeland! "Pray," he goes on to say,
that the true Protestant religion may still flourish among us . . . . O pray that the Lord will continue the invisible token of his presence among us, his ordinances, that England may be called Jehovah-shammah, "the Lord is there."56
This geographical conception of Christ's kingdom is a natural outcome of an unhealthy old covenant orientation, which points men and nations to the old exodus, instead of starting with the mighty spiritual exodus accomplished in Christ.
A pervasive Christ-orientation is missing in Watson's ethics. He says, "if the moral law could justify, what need was there of Christ's dying?"57 But he earlier stated that the moral law is able to "sanctify," so we must ask him, "if this be the case, what need is there of the Holy Spirit?" His system leaves us in an awkward (and impossible', situation where the law cannot justify, but it can sanctify. According to him, we need Christ to justify us; but the law is sufficient to instruct us. It is obvious that there is something incongruous taking place here.
The Dutch Reformed Perspective:
Herman Bavinck
Bavinck has many good statements to make, but does not appear to allow these remarks to control his total approach to ethics. More than Watson, he constantly emphasizes that "Christ is our sanctification."58 Further, Bavinck wishes to press again and again that sanctification must not be conceived of as "a legal sanctification, but is and must remain an evangelical sanctification."59 In line with this, he sees faith as working in both justification and sanctification; not justification by faith, but sanctification by law.60 Thus, sanctification is
so inseparably related to the person of Christ that we cannot receive it except in communion with Christ himself; and this is, viewed from our side, only to be obtained and enjoyed through a true faith.61
The tension arises when Bavinck states:
even though it is altogether true that the law remains as the rule of life for the Christian, still the gospel never derives the exhortations to a holy war from the terrors of the law, but derives them rather from the high calling to which believers in Christ are called. 62
Bavinck wishes to maintain a centrality of the gospel:
according to the order which God himself has appointed in the church, the promises of the gospel precede the commandments of the law . . . . It is according to this order alone that a true moral life is possible.63
But when he comes to briefly discuss the "new commandment," he sees it as "new" because in the old covenant "the church and the nation coincided," but in the new age believers and the world are distinguished. 64 He completely misses the crucial historical element mentioned by Christ in connection with the new commandment: "as I have loved you." Thus"while Bavinck sees a gospel priority, he simply refers the believer back to the Ten Commandments as a "brief summary of the Christian ethic and an unsurpassed rule for life."65 Does not the New Testament, however, contemplate the love of Christ as that unsurpassed act which becomes our norm and rule of conduct? 66 Certainly our Lord was the perfect embodiment and fulfillment of that law; but that is all the more confirmation that Jesus--His work and words--is our starting,point in Christian ethics. Again, Bavinck rightly observes:
In short, we should have to record all the moral exhortations in the New Testament if we were fully to summarize all the imperatives set forth to encourage believers to a holy walk. But the passages cited are sufficient to indicate that they are all derived from the gospel and not from the law. Irrespective of whether the apostles are addressing themselves to men or to women, to parents or to children, to masters or to servants, to women or to maids, to rulers or to subjects, they exhort them all in the Lord.67
As long as we isolate the Decalogue as the essence of our ethic, we will have a marked tendency to play down, or miss, the most significant dynamic of our ethic--the love of God in Christ's death, which provides the impetus for holy behavior. The new exodus (Christ's death/resurrection), which constitutes a once-for-all event, brings with it a "new commandment."
Remember that in the New Testament ethical perspective the issue is not really one of content, but of an "above all redemptive-historical" consideration. 68 If Jesus is our starting point in salvation, must we not be controlled by this starting point in our ethics?
Progressive Reformed Perspective:
Herman Ridderbos
Ridderbos is "progressive,' because he, like G.C. Berkouwer, has openly re-evaluated certain aspects of the historic Reformed tradition. Further, it is clear that he is keenly sensitive to the redemptive-historical orientation of Paul. Overall, Ridderbos, treatment of the "new obedience" is very satisfying.
Ridderbos says "that the imperative [to duty] rests on the indicative [of redemption] and . . . this order is not reversible."69 This, of course, parallels the teaching of John 13:34, where the imperative to love rests on the reality of Christ's love at the cross.
Romans 12:1-2. In Paul's writings, says Ridderbos, a "theoretic [God-centered] viewpoint predominates." This is evident, for example, in Rom. 12:1-2 where "appeal to the redeeming activity of God in Christ takes precedence," and is "the point of departure" for Paul's practical instruction to the church.70 "The theocentric point of view . . . constitutes the great point of departure of the Pauline paraenesis [ethic] ."71 The demand upon us which arises out of Christ's redemption is "totalitarian," meaning that no area of life is left untouched by it, and that it comprehends all of our actions. 72
Ridderbos believes that it is in the death and resurrection of Christ "that the individual commandments and precepts appear again and again to have their root and deepest motive."73
The law as the rule of life. In light of the "theocentric and totalitarian character" of Paul's ethic, "the question now arises as to whether and in what way the norm of the new life thus described is to be determined."74 Specifically, does the law function "as the standard for the new life?" 75
Ridderbos' conclusion is that "one will therefore not be able to maintain that love or the Spirit or even Christ as the norm and the rule of conduct of the new life, at least if this would mean a substitution for the law." 76 Thus, he sees the law as a "source for knowledge of the will of God."77 While it is clear that the essential ethic of both Testaments is the same, one wonders if Ridderbos is doing justice to the law which is connected to the new covenant (John 13:34; Gal. 6:2), especially in light of other statements he makes such as "with the advent of Christ the validity of the law in its historical form has not remained the same." 78
Thus, the law as Scripture instructs the Christian in righteousness, but the law as covenant no longer obtains. 79 "With Christ's advent," says Ridderbos, "the law, also as far as its content is concerned, has been brought under a new norm of judgment and that failure to appreciate this new situation is a denial of Christ (Gal. 5:2)."80 Thus, "Christ also represents the new standard of judgment as to what 'has had its day, in the law and what has abiding validity (Col. 2:17)."81 It is in light of this that Ridderbos can say regarding the Sabbath commandment:
The fact that Paul speaks in this manner concerning the sabbath [Col. 2:171 proves that for him the fourth commandment of the Decalogue no longer had any abiding significance. In addition, as appears probable, the observance of the first day of the week was not viewed as the New Testament's prolongation of the Old Testament sabbath.82
"In Christ" we can face the Ten commandments squarely-even the Sabbath, which, as a shadow, finds its fulfillment in Christ, who is the body (Col. 2:17).
"There can thus be no doubt whatever," he goes on to say,
that the category of the law has not been abrogated with Christ's advent, but rather has been maintained and interpreted in its radical sense ("fulfilled," Matt. 5:17); on the other hand, that the church no longer has to do with the law in any other way than in Christ and thus is ennomos Christou .83
Ridderbos' study of Paul has led him to conclude that Christ has brought a "new canon," which is "above all redemptive-historical in nature." 84
The canon given with the new creation (Gal. 6:16) appears to represent the category of the law (I Cor. 7:19) as well as those of love (Gal. 5:6) and of the Spirit (Phil. 3:3) . . . . It can appear on the one hand that the law once given is no longer all important. The content of the will of God is also determined from Christ as the Inaugurator of the new creation. Therefore to serve God by the Spirit means not only a new possibility of performing the law, but also a new view of the law, that of faith in the fulfilling work of Christ.85
Thus, as could be expected, the Pauline ethic parallels the order found in John 13:34.
The content of the new obedience in the epistles of Paul too, finds its most central and fundamental expression in love. In the first place this love derives its central significance from the fact that it is the reflection of the love of God in Jesus Christ The love of God revealed in Christ's self surrender and working itself out by the Holy Spirit in the love of the church is the real secret and the clearest expression of its holiness . . . . The application of the commandment to love consequently has in Paul the clear effect of stirring up the strong awareness in the church of mutual responsibility . . . . The liberty in Christ must show itself especially in this, that believers are to be servants one of another through love (Gal. 5:13) . . . . The particularizing of this love constitutes a large part of the content of the Pauline paraenesis.86
In terms of an overall ethical structure, it is clear that Ridderbos sees the priority of the person and work of Christ. Duty flows out of union with Christ. The "will of God" must be sought above all in the revelation of Christ. The new exodus accomplished by Christ is the starting point of the comprehensive demand on those who "live" by Christ (II Cor. 5:14-15).
A Dispensational Perspective:
L.S. Chafer
While not all contemporary Dispensationalists would agree with everything Chafer said in his Systematic Theology , it must be acknowledged that this work has provided, in terms of academic influence, the formative structure for students entrenched in Dispensationalism. On a more popular level, C.I. Schofield's Reference Bible no doubt has had the most formative influence. Certain modifications of Chafer's system by present-day Dispensationalists cannot affect it sufficiently to alter the basic structure. This is so because Dispensationalism is built confidently upon certain "distinctions" and "order of events." One, therefore, cannot modify these crucial building blocks without at the same time causing the entire structure to crumble.
In approaching Chafer's ethical perspective we are immediately confronted with his peculiar prophetic outlook. in Chafer's system even ethics is eschatologically qualified, for his rigid premillennialism controls all loci of systematic theology. This is simply to say that Chafer's ethical outlook is founded on certain assumptions regarding future prophecy. If the Scriptures demonstrate that any one of the pillars of his system are mistaken, then his whole Israel-centered eschatology falls to the ground.
Three ages and three rules of life. Chafer felt that the fault of most ethical treatments was that they left out "obvious distinctions." 87 These "distinctions," as Chafer saw them, were comprised of "three major ages":88 (1) the past Mosaic age, (2) the present church age, and (3) the future "kingdom age." "There are, then," said Chafer, "three separate and distinct systems of divine government disclosed in the scriptures, corresponding to three separate and distinct ages to be governed." 89
In terms of "the believer's rule of life," then, we are dealing with the second, or middle, age. This church era, said Chafer, is "an intercalation--a period thrust in which is wholly unrelated to that which went before and to that which follows." 90 Thus, he saw much continuity between ages one and three; but Chafer made it clear in the most unequivocal terms that the church age has nothing to do with the other two ages. 91 Let us examine Chafer's view of the church age.
John 4:20-24. Chafer boldly asserted that "Judaism is not the bud which blossomed into Christianity."92 Much could be said to refute this,93 but here one crucial passage will be examined. Jesus told the Samaritan woman at the well, "you worship you know not what: we know what we worship: for [the] salvation is of [Greek, ek ] the Jews." "The salvation" relates to that which has come in the last days by the Son: "of which salvation the prophets have enquired and searched diligently" (I Pet. 1:9-10). "The Jews" indicates that the "truth" about the salvation of the Messianic age was given of old in the Old Testament (Luke 24:27, 44; Acts 3:24--l'Yes, and all the prophets from Samuel and those that follow after, as many as have spoken, have likewise foretold of these [gospel] days.") The Jews were never an (eternal) end in themselves, as Dispensationalists assert, but were a (temporary) means to a great end, even the coming of Christ (Rom. 9:5).
This passage also pinpoints the continuity and discontinuity of the Old and New Ages. "The Salvation" arises out of the oracles of God given to the Jews (Rom. 9:4). But the new age in which this salvation occurs ushers in a new worship in which all temporal conceptions (Jerusalem vs. Mt. Gerizim) are abolished (4:21, 23). The continuity lies in the "Spirit of Christ" which testified in the Old Testament documents of this age of grace (I Pet. 1:10); the discontinuity lies in the taking away of the Old Covenant as a legal administration (Matt. 27:51; Heb. 10:9) in order that an age of maturity (sonship) may replace an age of childhood (Gal. 3:24-4:7).
The church age. As pointed out above, Chafer saw the age of grace as totally unrelated to the past Mosaic age, and to what he conceives of as a future kingdom age. Thus, some of his general observations about the believer's rule of life are good, but his overall ethical outlook leaves much to be desired.
He saw that the Mosaic system had
been superseded by a new relationship which believers sustain to Christ and with it a new and higher requirement for daily living (John 1:16-17; Rom. 6:14; 7:2II Cor. 3:1-18; Gal. 3:19-25; Eph. 2:15; Col. 2:14).94
However, Chafer has not rightly defined the nature of this "new relationship," for he drives a wedge between God's people of all ages.95 Since the just have always lived by faith from Abel onwards (Heb. 10:38-11:4), the "new relationship" can only be defined in terms of the advance of redemptive history. It is the historical manifestation of Christ which brings a full disclosure of the Father (John 1:14-18). There is only one salvation. But that salvation was progressively revealed in the historical process. Thus, the just men and women of the era before Christ looked forward to the seed Who would come; the saints of the era after Christ both in experience and knowledge surpass the portion of those of the old age. But this occurs, not because those in the new age are "more,' justified than those of old, but because the revelation of Christ has brought more light, and the work of Christ has brought reality in the place of shadow and type (Matt. 13:17; John 1:14-18; Gal. 4:6-7; Rom. 3:25; Heb. 9:15). It is only in this light that we can understand Hebrews 11:39-40.
And these all, having obtained a good report through faith, received not the promise: God having provided some better thing for us, that they without us should not be made perfect.
There is a unity of God's people in all ages, but there was a disparity in terms of comparative knowledge and experience. The unity is maintained and the disparity accounted for only as we see that the historical manifestation of the Word is the culmination and climax of all the promises to the fathers (Heb. 1:1; John 1:14).
Furthermore, Chafer was not able to rightly define the "new and higher requirement" on the Christian, for again he drove a wedge between the ethics of the Old and New eras. He states over and over again that there is absolutely no essential ethical continuity between the first and second eras.96 But the two great commandments of the law, love to God and neighbor (Deut. 6:5; Lev. 19:18), on which the law and prophets hung (Matt. 7:12; 22:36-40), provide an ethical continuity from Adam to the end of history. The "new commandment" of Christ is an old commandment in one sense (John 13:34). What makes it "new" is a strictly redemptive-historical consideration: "as I have loved you: greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends" (John 15:12-13). The pervasive command to love is based on the Old Testament; the commandment of Christ to love is based on a historical act of love which sealed the New Covenant (Matt. 26:28; I John 4:9-10). Thus, the "new and higher requirement" cannot be conceived of in terms of having nothing to do with the ethical core of the Mosaic age, 97 but must be identified with the love of God in Christ--"as I have loved you." He who has the love of God poured out by the Holy Spirit in his heart fulfills whatever law may require (Gal. 5:14; Rom. 13:10).
Chafer postpones the core of Christ's law. Chafer stated that "the will of Christ for the believer is the law of Christ'." 98 While this statement is accurate on the surface, he introduced a line of thought which takes away from the Christian the core of Christ's law. That core is nothing less than the "manifesto of the King," 99 the Sermon on the Mount. For Chafer, the Sermon on the Mount belongs "to a future age."100
Why? Because Jesus was in this Sermon "offering" an earthly kingdom to the Jews. Since they refused this kingdom, it was "postponed" until after the church is "raptured" out, and then God's "earthly" plan with Israel will begin again in the "kingdom age." 101 Thus, the "kingdom age" is in continuity with the Mosaic age.
The law system is not introduced again at the beginning of the kingdom age; it is continued with certain additions directly from the Mosaic system with no reference to, or contributions from, the intercalation age . . . . The Old Testament story runs directly into the kingdom age without the slightest recognition of the present age or its purpose, and that the present age is, therefore, wholly disassociated from, and contributes nothing to, the Old Testament program.102
This meant, for Chafer, that Matthew 5:1-7:29 must be parallel with the Mosaic period, and as a result the Sermon is described as:
a reverting to the legal principle of the past Mosaic age . . . the teachings of the kingdom increase the burden of works of merit . . . self-earned blessing intensely legalistic . . . done meritoriously . . . and are almost wholly in disagreement with the teachings of grace.103
The essence of his point is this: the gospel (present age) is "hear and believe" (John 5:24), and "grace teachings" primarily surface in the "My commandments" found in John 1316, which are given after the Jews have "rejected" the kingdom "offered" to them; the kingdom (future age) is "hear and do" (Matt. 7:24), "these sayings of mine," and "I say to you."104 Chafer, then, divided the sayings of Christ into those of "grace" (those given near the hour of His death), and those of "law" (those centering in Matt. 5:1-7:29). The first group is for the church; the second group is for a future age.
This is a wholly arbitrary and unsatisfactory manner of handling the Sermon on the Mount. This Sermon constitutes the heart of the "law of Christ" for Christians, and yet Chafer has taken it out of this age and out of the realm of grace.
Chafer's basic assumption is that Christ opened His public ministry by "offering" an earthly kingdom to the Jews. But the message of John the Baptist, Jesus, and the apostles is one: "repent, for the kingdom of God is at hand" (Matt. 3:2; 4:17; Luke 24:47; Acts 1:2-3; 2:38; 28:31). In Peter's words to Cornelius' household we find it clearly taught that the one gospel was (1) "sent to Israel;" (2) "published throughout all Judea, and began from Galilee;" and (3) now preached to the Gentiles (Acts 10:3443). Anyone can check the Englishman's Greek Concordance (pp. 320-321) on the Greek noun for "gospel" and see that there is only one gospel which began with the manifestation of Christ. For example, in Mark 1:1 and 16:15 we find reference to the "gospel" both at the beginning of Christ's ministry, and in connection with history until the end of the age. Splitting up Christ's message into an earthly kingdom and into a parenthetical church age cannot be sustained exegetically, and results in twisted interpretations of Scripture.
For example, when Chafer came to the Great Commission (Matt. 28:20), he asserted that "all things I have commanded you "cannot include the Sermon on the Mount, for these 'legal' words of Christ are "wholly of the future." 105
Chafer felt that "hear and do" (Matt. 7:24) had to be legal and "opposed to grace." But the New Testament obviously does not feel such a tension. In II Thess. 1:8, Paul states that God's vengeance will come upon those who "obey not the gospel." Such terminology as "obedient to the faith" does not cast aspersion on the purely gracious character the gospel. Thus, Christ's words in Matt. 7:21, "he that does the will of my Father who is in heaven" (which Chafer assigned to another age as "self-earned blessing") are in entire agreement with John's words in I John 2:17, "he that does the will of God abides forever" (obviously addressed to those under grace).
In Acts 20:35, Paul cites the "words of the Lord Jesus, 'it is more blessed to give than to receive."' These words of Christ sound strikingly similar to the Sermon on the Mount and have been called by some the "ninth Beatitude." Paul viewed-the corpus of Christ's words as a unit (I Tim. 6:3), and Chafer's unnatural division of Christ's words into "gracious" and "legal" can only be supported by nonexegetical gymnastics.
There are, to be sure, some statements of Christ that are qualified by the historical context. When Christ said, "Go, show yourself to the priest" (Matt. 8:4), He was speaking as One who had healed in the social environment of the Mosaic covenant. The issue in such cases, however, is not "legal" versus "gracious" words, but words of the gospel spoken in a society "under law."
Chafer stated that in the Sermon on the Mount "there is never a reference to either salvation or grace. Nor is there the slightest reference to those great realities of relationship which belong to the New Creation."106 However, it is obvious that those precious words are applicable to only those in vital union with Christ (Matt. 6:8; 7:11). And wherever such union exists, it will be constituted, not by "self-earned blessing," but by free grace. Chafer assumes the impossible by asserting that a relationship between God and sinners--in any age--can be realized by works of merit.107 Salvation always parallels Abraham's experience: by promise through faith (Rom. 4:12).
Chafer in his complicated and arbitrary system has apprehended the basic truth that with the establishment of the "age of grace" a new ethical administration has come.108 But, tragically, he destroyed any possibility of Biblically understanding his new economy because he (1) completely dissociated the present age from the ethical core of the Old Testament; and (2) relegated to a future "legal" age much of Christ's ethical instruction which is for today.
A Reconstructionist Perspective:
Greg Bahnsen
Chafer lived before the days of the contemporary Chalcedon movement, and thus he felt confident in saying: "No legalist proposes to carry forward into grace the judgments which governed the social life of Israel, or the ordinances which governed their religious ritual in the land."109 However, men like Greg Bahnsen do believe that the laws of the Old Testament are yet binding on the Christian and society. 110
Here an article entitled "God's Law in New Testament Ethical Themes" will be examined.111 This is an especially important article for it pinpoints a critical deficiency in Bahnsen's perspective.
First, the contents of this article will be reviewed, and then some reasons will be given why this perspective is retrogressive.
In this essay, Bahnsen begins by quoting the Pauline expression in Rom. 12:2, "the good, well-pleasing, and perfect will of God." He then states that "perhaps the most fundamental ethical concept in either the Old or New Testament is that of the will of God," and that "Paul can encapsulate New Testament ethics in one stroke, saying 'Be not foolish, but understand what the will of the Lord is' (Eph. 5:17)."112 The question naturally arises, "Where do we find the will of God" since this is of such vital concern to the Christian. It is Bahnsen's reply to this question that will occupy our attention.
He believes that the "will of God" is to be discovered in the Old Testament; that this is so because the New Testament "offers little by way of an explicit answer to such a question;" and that, therefore, the Old Testament is the "unchallengeable norm for Christian conduct." 113 Here are his convictions.
Indeed, we are to aim to stand perfect, fully assured in all the will of God (Col. 4:12). Well, where do we learn, understand, and become assured of God's will? The New Testament offers little by wav of an explicit answer to such a question. We learn that the will of God stands over against the lusts of men (I Pet. 4:2), and in a very few cases we are told what the will of God specifically requires (e.g., abstaining from fornication and giving thanks in all things, I Thess. 4:3; 5:18). However, there is no detailed discussion of the requirements of God's will, and concrete guidance in God's will as such is not systematically explored. Why not? Especially since the will of God is such a crucial ethical theme, we might have expected differently. The answer lies in recognizing that the common conviction of the inspired New Testament writers is that the will of God has been given a specific and sufficient explication in the Old Testament already. It is simply assumed that one can speak of "the will of God" without explanation because it is obvious that God's will traces back to the revelation of His will in the law previously committed to scripture.114
These sentiments reveal the heart of Bahnsen's ethical perspective: the believer's primary norm is not Christ's commandments, but the detail of the Mosaic economy. Bahnsen feels that "every attempt to reject the [Old Testament] law of God in the New Testament era meets with embarrassment before the text of the New Testament itself." 115 However, every attempt to reference the believer's rule of life to the details of the Mosaic era is rejected by the New Testament teachings. What follows are some reasons why Bahnsen's position is retrogressive.
1. Bahnsen perpetuates the details of an economy designated as "beggarly elements" in the New Testament (Gal. 4:9-10). Neither Chafer nor Bahnsen will recognize the Mosaic era for what it was: a temporary age "added" to the Abrahamic promise-covenant, which was terminated when "faith came" in the manifestation of the Son (Gal. 3:17, 19, 25). Chafer saw the Mosaic age as resurrected in an era following the "age of grace;" Bahnsen sees its law-code as continuing in force in this age. D. Martyn Lloyd-Jones' comments on Rom. 5:20 are incisive and of singular significance.
The very word "added alongside," that Paul uses here, tells us that the Law, in and of itself, is not something that is of fundamental importance to us. it is something additional, it is something that has come in for the time being, for a particular function. it is not fundamental in the sense that sin and salvation are fundamental; it is something that enters, an addition, something that "comes in alongside of . . . . It has a function, but it is not vital in the matter of salvation. . . . What then is the function of the Law according to the Apostle? It has been brought in alongside in order that the offense, the sins, might abound.116
The New Testament portrays the age of Israel as an added age sandwiched in between the Abrahamic promise covenant and the coming of the "seed," Who is Christ (Gal. 3:16, 19). However, it is at the same time in organic relationship to the Abrahamic covenant and is "not against the promises of God" (Gal. 3:21). On the other hand, the occasion for Paul's pursuing of this line of thought is the fact that the Mosaic law-covenant is, in terms of legal administration, "not of faith, but 'the man that does them shall live in them," (Gal. 3:12). This latter fact cannot be recognized adequately in Covenant Theology, for in order to maintain their system, they must view the Mosaic age as another administration of the "one Covenant of Grace."
The Mosaic law, "added" to the Abrahamic covenant, is described as as age of immaturity (Gal. 3:24, 4:2-3). When "faith came" in Christ, an age of maturity and sonship is ushered in (Gal. 4:4-7). To assert, therefore, as Bahnsen does, that the "perfection" of Christian (and societal) behavior is to be located in the "exhaustive detail" of a paidagogos 117 can only be denominated as retrogressive. And, in the context of Paul's concern for the Galatians, the apostle saw that any demand for believers to make the old economy their rule of life was tantamount to forfeiting their liberty which Christ purchased (Gal. 5:1). The apostle Paul saw the details of the Mosaic period as useful in a past age of childhood; Bahnsen sees these details as mandatory in an advanced age of maturity.
If it can be shown that any mandatory laws of the old age are no longer a standard of judgment under the New Covenant, then Bahnsen's unequivocal endorsement of the exhaustive "abiding validity of the law in detail" is shown to be invalid. Nothing could be clearer in the New Testament than the fact that the dietary distinctions of "clean and unclean" no longer obtain in the new age (Rom. 14:2, 14; I Tim. 4:3-5; Acts 10:10-16; 15:28-29; Mark 7:19 [NASV, NIV). These dietary laws were temporary, and have been set aside with the establishment of a better covenant. The New Testament embarrasses anyone who would seek to reference the believer to the details of Old Covenant caselaw.
2. Bahnsen perpetuates an economy which has been terminated. The New Testament speaks with clarity regarding the starting and ending points of the Mosaic age (Gal. 3:17, 19; Heb. 8:7, 13; 10:9; Matt. 27:51). Yet Bahnsen sees the totality of "the commandments of God's law in the Old Testament" as a "sufficient and valid standard of God's will.
At this point a Biblical distinction of critical importance must be emphasized. If this distinction was grasped, much confusion would be dispelled. The Mosaic covenant, as a legally valid administration in history, had a beginning and an end, as the passages above indicate. However, the inspired documents that emerged in the historical development of that economy abide in the Messianic age. Thus, to assert that the Mosaic covenant has been terminated does not mean that the Old Testament documents are irrelevant in the new economy. This distinction forces us to face the question, "How then, are the abiding documents of the Old Testament to be used by the church?" The New Testament reveals a Christocentric (Christ-centered)--not a nomocentric (law-centered)-perspective with reference to the Old Testament. The postresurrection use of the Old Testament by Christ, and the post-Pentecost use of it by the apostles reveals that these documents were consistently employed to confront men with "the things concerning" Jesus the Messiah (Luke 24:27, 44; Acts 17:2-3; 26:22-23). This perspective provides a revealed priority in approaching these documents. And this perspective certainly calls into question Bahnsen's confident assertion that the New Testament views the Old Testament as a detailed law-code which is binding on Christians. Viewing the Old Testament in the new age as an enduring and detailed law-code is precisely what the New Testament does not do.
The book of Galatians illustrates why the New Testament does not reference the believer to the details of this terminated legal administration. It is because the very foundation of this covenant is "not of faith" (Gal. 3:12). Thus, to make binding any of its details (even something which is "nothing," such as circumcision) constitutes one a debtor to fulfill all of its details (Gal. 5:1-4). There is no other way to put it except like this: the New Testament views any attempt to impose the details of an era of childhood upon the church as a threat to the truth as it is in Christ (Gal. 4:11, 21).
Further, Bahnsen's position equates a temporary and temporal earthly nation (and its structural law-code) with the spiritual and eternal kingdom of Christ. In other words, the detailed rules in force during the Israelite theocracy related to the separation of a geographically defined nation from the other nations. These rules were typical in nature, and were ultimately related to the spiritual realities which appeared in the age of Christ (Heb. 8:5; 9:8; Col. 2:17). Thus, in Christ's kingdom the mandatory temporal dimension of worship under the Old Covenant ("Jerusalem is the place where men ought to worship," John 4:20) is superseded by a spiritual worship in which temporal considerations no longer obtain ("the hour comes when you shall neither in the mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem, worship the Father," John 4:21). The distinction made in the New Testament is not conceived of geographically (Israel and the nations), but spiritually (the church as called out from the evil world system, I John 2:,15-17). In the old era it was valid to defend the honor of God in the theocracy with the steel sword. But Jesus' words to Peter and Pilate reveal that His kingdom is not to be conceived of in terms of physical magisterial authority:
put up again your sword into his place: for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword . . . . My kingdom is not of this world: if My kingdom were of this world, then would My servants fight (Matt. 26: 52-53; John 18:36).
Consequently, Bahnsen's position must meet with embarrassment, for the detailed national law-code of Israel is wholly inappropriate for the spiritual form of Messiah's kingdom (Rom. 14:17).
3. Bahnsen imposes an economy on people for whom it was never intended. It seems very clear that both the Old and New Testaments assume that the Old Covenant was made only with Israel. Thus, when Bahnsen cites the words of Christ, "if you would enter into life, keep the commandments" (Matt. 19:16-17) as proof that what is "ethically good" must be referenced "to the Old Testament law," he is making the fatal mistake of imposing the legal principle of the Mosaic covenant--"do this and live" (Luke 10:28)--upon all men in general, and upon Christians in particular.
But Paul was more flexible than this. When he was among Gentiles, he became "without- law" (anomos ), being himself "in law to Christ" (I Cor. 9:21, ennomos Christou ). As F.F. Bruce states:
Paul's way was not to impose the Mosaic law on them [Gentiles], but to emphasize the law of Christ--to insist that the gospel which had brought them salvation had ethical implications and to spell out in detail what those implications were.118
The essential perspective which determines what is "ethically good" is the manifestation of God's love in Christ. It is ethically good for Christians to love one another because Christ loved them through self-sacrifice (John 13:34-35; 15:12-13); it is ethically good for Christians to please their neighbor because Christ "pleased not Himself" (Rom. 15:2-3); it is ethically good for Christians not to be self-centered because Christ became of no reputation and gave His life a ransom for many (Phil. 2:3-7); it is ethically good for Christians to abstain from fornication because Christ has purchased their bodies (I Cor. 6:18-20); and it is ethically good for Christians to give sacrifically of their material goods because of Christ's supreme example of giving (II Cor. 8:9). The "ethical good" is clearly revealed in the example and effects of the New Exodus which was accomplished in the work of Christ (Luke 9:31). And in all the above New Testament examples the believer is referenced to the person and work of his Lord, not to the details of the old economy.
To refer the believer to the details of a terminated economy, and not to the new and living way of grace and truth in Christ (John 1:14-18; Heb. 10:20), is manifestly retrogressive.
Traditional Reformed Ethics:
Carl F.H. Henry
Carl Henry's massive Christian Personal Ethics reflects a traditional approach to ethics. At points he recognizes some important principles, but the implications of redemptive history have not penetrated his commitment to covenant theology.
He discusses "Love, The Divine Imperative in Personal Relations,"119 But says nothing about love as rooted in the redemptive work of Christ. He acknowledges that the relationship of Christ's death to a life of virtue is "not adequately worked out in many treatises on Christian ethics."120 However, his own treatment ends up saying that Christ saves us, but that He has little to say concerning our ethics.
In his handling of the Sermon on the Mount, Henry posits the traditional Protestant idea that it does not set forth a comprehensive ethic, but "gives an individualistic articulation of ethics."121 The Reformed view of Christian odediance, then, ends up with two ethics, public and private. The Sermon on the Mount, therefore, relates "to the person at my side, and not with the larger question of my duty to social groups in the order of economics and politics, or to humanity as a whole."122 This "man-to-man ethic" is not for private life only. Thus privately the Christian turns his cheek, but publicly can presumably blow others to pieces.
A two-fold ethic is difficult to apply. When do "private" actions end and "public" actions begin? In those existential situations where decisions must be made hurriedly, how does one determine what is a "private" action which demands one course, or a "public" action that demands another course? As Norman Geisler points out, "a double standard ethic--one for the private citizen and another for the public official--is foreign to the teaching of the New Testament." 123 Jesus gives one ethic which can be applied to all of our life-situations.
The main concern is highlighted in some comments and questions Jim Wallis put before Carl Henry.
The issue is how we view Christ: whether Jesus Christ is axiomatic for us on a personal, political, and economic level. My basic discomfort with the social ethics of mainline Christendom is the failure to come to terms with the incarnation of God in Christ. Jesus Christ, as I understand the New Testament, is not only the means of my atonement, but the pattern for my life. Is Jesus Christ politically axiomatic for the believing community?124
Henry's reply reveals that he feels compelled to qualify the centrality of Christ in Christian ethics.
While I agree with you wholly that Jesus is the example of incarnate sonship, I don't think you can infer from the lifestyle of Jesus all the criteria that should govern Christian living in the world.125
Later in the interview, Wallis summarizes some key issues.
What concerns me is how this has worked out historically. What has happened in the doing of mainstream social ethics is that the ethics no longer derive from God in Christ but derive from the state or from notions of civil government. Reinhold Niebuhr, for instance, says that the nonresistant, nonviolent Jesus, while most faithful to the historical Christ, is just not adequate for determining public ethics . . . . I can understand how Reinhold Niebuhr does that because of his weak Christology, but I'm alarmed when his is the major text at evangelical colleges teaching political science . . . . Is Jesus the norm for us, or isn't He?126
A Neo-Evangelical Perspective:
Daniel Fuller
Daniel Fuller's Gospel and Law: Contrast or Continuum? seeks to answer the law-gospel debate in the history of theology by suggesting that "the antithesis [of law and gospel] is only apparent and not real," and that both the old and new covenants are conditional. 127 There are indeed some helpful insights in this book, but Fuller leaves some crucial questions unanswered, and asserts some far-reaching conclusions that do injustice to the clear teaching of Scripture.
First, Fuller documents some "problems" of dispensationalism and covenant theology with reference to law and gospel. Historically, covenant theology has asserted both that law and gospel are distinct, and that even the law is an administration of the "covenant of grace."128 In covenant theology, however, the fusion of law and grace has dominated. On the other hand, dispensationalism has in the past maintained the sharpest distinction between law and grace. However, Fuller shows that in the final analysis both dispensationalism and covenant theology teach that "gracious revelations always appear alongside legal ones," and thus he concludes that "there is no longer any substantive difference between the two on the subject of law and gospel." 129 Hence, dispensationalists' "more recent explanations entangle them in covenant theology's problems." 130 Further, covenant theology has criticized dispensationalism for teaching "merit" in the Mosaic era. However, covenant theology has generally taught that before the fall Adam would have merited blessing had he stood in righteousness under the "covenant of works."131
Fuller's main problem with dispensationalism and covenant theology is that they teach that law is conditional and grace is unconditional. He concludes that both law and gospel are conditional. Thus, "God's forgiveness is conditional not only on Christ's dying for our sins, but also on our repentance."132 Further, he submits that "the enjoyment of grace [is] dependent on faith and good works." 133 At bottom, then, "all biblical promises (except these in the Noahic and Davidic covenants) are conditional." 134
Fuller seems to separate God's grace from its actualization. In other words, God's grace will not be realized unless people fulfill the "conditions." Historically, it has been taught that in the new covenant God grants even the means to salvation--faith and repentance (Eph. 2:8-9; II Tim. 2:25). But Fuller rejects the idea that faith is described as a gift from God in Ephesians 2:8:9, and asserts that this teaching "clashes with the fact that the pronoun 'this' is neuter, whereas the preceding 'faith' is feminine in the Greek." 135 But Robert Countess has exegetically demonstrated in a paper delivered to the Evangelical Theological Society that "salvation with all its component parts is of God; even the faith with which a man subjectively appropriates the Gospel is bestowed by God." 136 It remains for Fuller to explain how men fulfill "conditions:" (1) do they meet them in their own "free will?;" (2) or does God grant them as a gift?
Fuller regards the Abrahamic covenant as "conditional." 137 However, the "cutting" of this covenant, described in Genesis 15, indicates that God is putting Himself on the line. He passes through the pieces of meat. This covenant is based on God's unilaterial promise. Meredith Kline has amply demonstrated that there are two kinds of covenants in the Ancient Near East and in Scripture. The Abrahamic covenant is promissory, while the Mosiac covenant is bilateral.138 This does not mean that there are no responsibilities placed on those in the covenant, but it does mean that God is committed to the success of the covenant arrangement.
Fuller misses the fact that there was indeed a legal foundation to the Mosaic covenant, "do this and live." The basis of this covenant was absolute, unqualified obedience. Failure to walk in all of it would bring the curses of the covenant. This legal arrangement was in force until the Seed came (Gal. 3:17). He was born "under law" and both fulfilled its requirements and took its curse upon Himself so that we might live. The law said, "obey in order to be blessed." The gospel says, "Jesus is the righteous one; because you are blessed in Him, obey His commands."
Fuller takes the position that in Romans 10:5-8 and Galatians 3:10-12 Paul is not dealing with the law itself, but with the twisted misrepresentation of it by the Pharisees and Judaizers. 139 No doubt there was a perversion of the law by the false teachers, for the Old Testament testifies of Jesus Christ (Rom. 1:2; 3:21). However, in his book Fuller fails to make an important distinction. The "law" can have reference to the Mosaic covenant or to what we call the Old Testament. The Old Testament speaks of Christ, of faith, and of the gospel. But Israel stumbled over the stumbling block laid in Zion, Jesus Christ (Rom. 9:32-33). Paul sees a danger in continuing under the old covenant which obligates one to do all that it requires (Gal. 5:3). The legal foundation of the Mosaic covenant, "do this and live," was "not of faith.11 But the old covenant Scriptures taught that salvation was based on promise in the Abrahamic covenant, "the just shall live by faiths'' Fuller admits that if "law" in Galatians 3:18 refers to "revelatory law" and not to a "legalistic frame of mind," "then the crucial thesis of this book would be invalid."140
It is significant that Fuller notes how the problems at Galatia actually focused on sanctification.141 "The Galatians had commenced the Christian life properly; the whole issue had to do with sanctification, as to how one progresses in the Christian life." 142 Hence, Fuller rightly observes that "to the extent that one uses the law--understood as what a workman does for an employer--to aid in sanctification ' he is submitting to that which is contrary to faith." 143 Thus,
Paul would be as angry with modern dispensationalism (and also covenant theology) as he was with the Galatian churches, who were at fault for wanting to add works to their faith . . . . Consequently, Calvin could never predicate sola fide to sanctification, as well as to justification, a thus he is guilty of the Galatian heresy.144
The biggest problem in Fuller's treatment is his failure to properly differentiate the Mosaic and new covenants. Since he posits that all covenants are conditional (except the Noahic and Davidic), he can do no justice to the superiority of the new covenant. To say that "the law and the gospel are one and the same"145 is contrary to many Scriptures.
Fuller dogmatically asserts that
the only difference between the new covenant and the old Mosaic covenant which it replaces is that people under the new covenant are given a new heart which has the inclination . . . to want to keep God's law.146
But there are other differences Fuller overlooks. First, God states that Israel "broke" the Mosaic covenant (Jer. 31:32). But the action of God giving a new heart apparently ensures that the new covenant will not be broken. This certainly raises questions about the "conditionality" Fuller imputes to the new covenant.
Second, the old covenant was on outward tablets and incapable of effecting righteousness. But in the new covenant God effects a reign of righteousness by "putting" His Spirit in believers.
Third, the old covenant was national and required only birth for membership. Personal faith was not a requirement in order to be part of the covenant community. But in the new covenant personal knowledge of God is the basis for covenant participation.
Fourth, the old covenant could not make anyone perfect, and there was-continual remembrance of sins. The new covenant takes away sin and effects the forgiveness of sins.
What the law could not do, God did in the new covenant. All of this seriously challenges Fuller's thesis that the new covenant depends on people fulfilling conditions. The new covenant emphasizes God's effectual initiative.
The New Testament answer to Fuller's dilemma is to couch the categories of law and grace in redemptive history, not in subjectivistic considerations. John 1:17, for instance, clearly teaches a significant difference in law and grace. There was an administration of law which Israel was "under." But now an administration of grace and truth has come in the fullness of time. The false teachers in Galatia were asking the believers to go back "under the law." Paul answers them by reviewing redemptive history, and showing that salvation is based on the promise to Abraham, not on the "do this and live" principle of the law added 430 years later. The Mosaic law-covenant is simply not the "same" as the Abrahamic promise-covenant. To go back under the "beggarly elements" of the Mosaic covenant is a fatal blow to the gospel (Gal. 4:8-10).
A Changed Perspective:
Robert D. Brinsmead
Robert Brinsmead was raised as a Seventh-Day Adventist. In the late 1950s he began to see glimpses of the gospel. By 1962, though still an Adventist, he was disfellowshipped under pressure from the Queensland Conference of Adventists. In 1970, he began to study the Reformation, and came to a clearer perception of justification by faith. Present Truth (now Verdict ) was begun in 1972, and brought justification to bear on various theological issues.
By embracing the Reformation view of justification by faith, it was natural for Brinsmead to also articulate its view of the law. He thus moved from an Adventist to Reformation view of the law (which, in fact, are not that far apart).
A 1979 issue of Verdict reflects his view of law before he gave the matter more thought in light of the gospel. The November 1979 issue dealt with "Lutherans in Crisis over Justification by Faith." The section on the "third use of the law" is relevant here. Brinsmead was then sensitive to the importance of redemptive history, but was trying to function within the Reformed perspective of law.
The prophets had also spoken of a new exodus under a new Moses at the end of the age . . . . The book of John presents Jesus as that new Moses of the new exodus. Just as the first Exodus gave birth to the nation of Israel, so the new exodus at Calvary would give birth to the new Israel.147
The "third use of the law." At stake in the "third use of the law" is this: "Is it a norm of Christian conduct and a rule of life?"148 Brinsmead has some questions for those who have problems with this "third use" of the law. By facing his questions several crucial areas can be isolated where our thinking can be Biblically sharpened. It will become apparent that these questions assume the validity of certain propositions which are in need of serious reexamination.
1. If the law of God is not seriously accepted as His will for man's life (third use), are not all the teeth removed from the law's accusatory function (second use)?..... Must not a person hear the law as a rule of life before he is accused of sin?149
These questions assume that law must be preached before gospel. But where in John 16:8-11 does Christ say that the Spirit will take the law and bring men to Christ? Rather, as Leon Morris observes,
it should not be overlooked that all three aspects of the work of the Holy Spirit dealt with in these verses are interpreted Christologically. Sin, righteousness and judgment are all to be understood because of the way they relate to Christ.150
Further, in the preaching found in Acts, where was the law ever preached as the rule of life in order to bring conviction (Acts 2:37)? As F.F. Bruce points out, "there is no evidence that Paul ever used the law in this way. "151 Where in Scripture is it revealed that the Holy Spirit must use the "teeth" of the law in sin-accusation? Is not the many-sided demand which is connected with coming to Christ (i.e., Luke 14:25-33), and the teaching of Christ (Matt. 5-7) is quite convicting? James Buchanan rightfully states:
It may be safely affirmed that it is by the Spirit's witness to Christ that he is first brought to see the magnitude of his guilt....... Christ's exaltation . . . is sufficient..... to carry home conviction of sin....... Hence we believe that the Gospel of Christ, and especially the doctrine of the cross of Christ, is the most powerful instrument for impressing the conscience of a sinner . . . . And this is because the Gospel, and especially the doctrine of the cross, contains in it the spirit and essence of the law.152
We must re-orient our thinking in light of a dogmatism which leaves the impression that the law is the only means of conviction. Obviously when the law comes to sinners, it plays an accusatory role. But even in this, as Buchanan indicates, the gospel has a priority.
2. If we say that the gospel rather than the law informs a Christian how he ought to live, have we not turned the gospel into a new law? Is this not failing to maintain the proper distinction between the law and the gospel?153
It is clear from our examination of Scripture, and interaction with other books, that indeed it is the case that the new exodus brings with it a new demand--not Ten Commandments, but one comprehensive "new commandment." The outworkings of this commandment are in entire harmony with the Law and Prophets (Matt. 7:12; 22:40). But if we are serious about redemptive history--as Brinsmead is--then must we not boldly assert that the gospel is completely sufficient to inform a Christian how to live? Is any area of our life left untouched by the implications of "as I have loved you?" Since Brinsmead acknowledges that Jesus is a new Moses, why can we not go to Him for law? Do we not need to realize that the traditional law/gospel distinction is essentially oblivious to the advance of redemptive history to a better covenant?
3. If we say that the Holy Spirit guides the Christian apart from using the law, are we not rejecting the old and well-established Lutheran principle of "the means of grace?". . . .,. And does not the idea of living without an objective rule of life expose us to all types of romanticism about Christian existence?154
Here it is assumed that the only conceivable "objective standard" is the Decalogue. But this is a false assumption. The New Testament speaks of a "canon" (rule) for the new Israel, and that is the "new creation" (Gal. 6:15-16), the law of love, is a very objective standard, and is the starting point of Christian ethics. The Holy Spirit guides the believer "according to Christ" (Rom. 15:5; Phil. 2:5; Eph. 4:20-21). Again, we must ask, why do we shrink back from starting with the new exodus; why do we skip over it and start with the old exodus? The Holy Spirit, by means of the objective gospel, leads us from "faith to faith," "glory to glory," and "grace upon grace" (Rom. 1:17; II Cor. 3:18; John 1:16). This gospel does not render the law worthless; but it does, in a redemptive-historical sense, render it subservient to the revelation of Christ in the gospel.
4. If Lutherans persist in relaxing the moral imperative, will not the gospel of justification by faith cease to be urgent and eventually fail to be relevant altogether?155
Here the assumption is that there is no "moral imperative" outside the Decalogue. But there is no more pervasive moral imperative than that which arises out of the event at Golgoltha (John 13:34-35; 15:12-13; I John 4:9-11). If we are not moved to a sacrificial life-style by a consideration of the demand commensurate with the cross, then all the commandments in the world will produce no holy living in us. If the love of Christ will not constrain us, nothing will. As Thielicke put it, "If I must be commanded by the law, this is a sign that I am not yet 'free'..... that I do not yet have the spontaneity of the new existence." 156 There are commands; but they are addressed to a people freed by the Spirit to serve righteousness from the heart (Rom. 6:17-18). There is an indicative which precedes the imperative. The commands of Christ are kept because there is love in the inner man, a love which is a response to the boundless love of God in Christ (John 14:15; I John 4:19). If we are captured by this, we will serve God in the newness of the Spirit and not in oldness of the letter (Rom. 7:6; II Cor. 3:6).
Changed perspective. However, in 1980 Brinsmead began to reason that if the gospel was to be central, why did it end up taking a back seat to the law in ethics? 157 His studies led him increasingly to see that the gospel brings both salvation and an ethic. The fruit of his pilgrimage in this regard was published in "Jesus and the Law." The "Editorial Introduction" summarizes the change in his perspective.
Our last two issues of Verdict ("Sabbatarianism Re-Examined" and "Jesus and the Sabbath") raised the entire question of the place of law in the New Testament. Is the law abolished or established by Jesus Christ?..... How should living in the new eschatological age of the Spirit affect ethics? Is not much that appears to be Christian ethics only a form of Christian Judaism or churchly Pharisaism?
About three years ago Verdict came to a new appreciation of the historical-redemptive framework of the Bible. (The writings of G. Ernest Wright, Oscar Cullmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg and George Eldon Ladd were among those which spurred a new appreciation for the theme of redemptive history.)
Before this, we had viewed theology in a more classical or systematic tradition. In this framework, revelation is regarded more as abstract propositional. information which has to be gathered and arranged in an ordered system. Thus, in classical Calvinism the law is treated primarily as a static code of life delivered from heaven for all time to come. Such a "flat Bible-' approach does not sufficiently allow for the dynamic interrelation of ethics and the flow of redemptive history.
It has taken us about three years to explore the implications of the historical-redemptive approach for Christian ethics. This issue of Verdict represents a crystallization of our thought in these areas . . . .
From the editor's personal perspective, the conclusions presented in this issue of Verdict represent as radical a theological breakthrough as that, which launched this journal ten years ago.158
The central thrust of Brinsmead's change in outlook can be seen in the following representative remarks from "Jesus and the Law."
All that the law was to Judaism, Christ was to the New Testament community. The law was the center of Judaism. The rabbis said that God spent the first three hours of every day studying the Torah. But Christ was the center of the apostolic faith . . . .
Whereas Judaism made the law their Christ, the New Testament community made Christ their law. All that the Ten Commandments and the Sabbath were to Judaism, Christ Himself became to apostolic faith . . . .
Thus, ample textual and typological evidence demonstrates the truth of this one simple thesis: Jesus Christ replaces the Torah. This is how the law is at once abolished and established. It is abolished because Christ becomes the norm and the rule of life for the believer. It is established because the reliever stands under the law of God as revealed in the Christ event . . . .
We say again that the New Testament does not make its appeal for proper behavior on the basis of Old Testament rules. It makes its appeal on the basis of the superior revelation of the will of God which has come in Jesus Christ. In the New Testament, Christ and His gospel are the standard by which all behavior is measured.
The idea that Christ sends us back to the law of Moses for our rule of life has a long and hallowed tradition. But it needs to be challenged because it rests on tradition and not on any solid New Testament evidence . . . .
Just as the law of Moses contained the moral imperatives which flow out of the Exodus-Sinai event, so the law of Christ embodies the moral imperatives which flow out of the death-resurrection event . . . .
A new covenant must have a new law. The command to love is not new, for Moses also commands us to love our neighbor. What is new in Christ's commandment is the command to love "as I have loved you." Love is given a new historical reference point. It is love defined by the cross of Christ. Moses could not command this kind of love, and therefore, his law is totally inadequate now that the new (and final) manifestation of love has been given in the Christ event . . . .
Puritan-Reformed theology goes to the Christ event for grace but returns to Moses for ethics. It says that Christ must structure our faith but Moses must structure our ethics. It sunders the dynamic relationship between the historical-redemptive event and the ethic which flows from it. In the classical tradition of Reformed theology the Ten Commandments are said to be the rule of life for the New Testament believer. But the Ten Commandments are the law of Moses or "the words of the [Mosaic] covenant" (Exod. 34:28; cf. Deut. 4:13). Because they flow out of the redemptive history of the Exodus, they are not adequate to express the nature of new-covenant life.159
1) Martin E. Marty, "The Idea of a Christian Society," A Short History of Christianity (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), pp. 97-119.
2) W.B. Selbie, "The Influence of the Old Testament on Puritanism," Searching Together , 8:3., 1979, pp. 13-21; Leonard Verduin, The Reformers and Their Stepchildren (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1980), pp. 23, 210-213.
3) William Klassen, Covenant and Community: The Life and Writings of Pilgram Marpeck (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1968), p. T45.
4) Verduin, p. 121.
5) Klassen, p. 21.
6) Klassen, p. 42; H. Carl Shank, "The Hermeneutics of Anabaptist Thought," Searching Together , 7:3, 1978, pp. 46, 4 7 .
7) Klassen, pp. 75, 98.
8) Richard Detweiler, "Luther and Menno," Mennonite Quarterly Review , July 1969, p. 201.
9) Detweiler, pp. 70-75.
10) Detweiler, pp. 204-205.
11) Herman Witsius, Oeconomy of the Covenants , I (New York, 1798), pp. 407, 411.
12) Detweiler, P. 209.
13) Detweiler, p. 212.
14) Unfortunately, many of the heirs of Anabaptism have retrogressed into an obscurantism which was not inherent in the core of Anabaptist theology and practice.
15) N.H.G. Robinson, The Groundwork of Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans publishing Co., 1971), p. 21.
16) Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics , I (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1979), pp. 97-98.
17) Thielicke, p. 99.
18) Thielicke, p. 100.
19) Thielicke, p. 103.
20) Thielicke, p. 106.
21) Thielicke, p. 120.
22) Thielicke, pp. 120, 104, 113, 122, 124.
23) Thielicke, pp. 39-47.
24) Thielicke, p. 52.
25) Thielicke, p. 56.
26) Thielicke, pp. 64-65.
27) Thielicke, p. 69.
28) Thielicke, p. 70.
29) Thielicke, p. 84-85.
30) Thielicke, p. 29.
31) Thielicke, p. 126.
32) Thielicke, pp. 127, 128.
33) Thielicke, p. 130.
34) Thielicke, pp. 131-132.
35) Thielicke, p. 132.
36) Thielicke, pp. 128-129.
37) Thielicke, p. 65.
38) Thielicke, p. 649.
39) Ridderbos, Paul--An Outline of His Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), p. 273; p. 286.
40) Ian Breward, "William Perkins and the Origins of Puritan Casuistry," Faith and A Good Conscience (London: Westminster Conference, 1963), p. 8.
41) Breward, p. 9.
42) Breward, p. 6.
43) Thomas Watson, The Ten Commandments (London: Banner of Truth, 1965), p. 3.
44) Watson, pp. 4-5.
45) Watson, pp. 9, 11.
46) Watson, p. 12.
47) Watson, p. 13.
48) Bruce Kaye, Law Morality and the Bible (Donners Grove: IVP, 1978), p. 89.
49) Watson, p. 13.
50) Watson, pp. 16, 47.
51) Ernest Kevan, The Law of God in Christian Experience (London: Keswick Conference, 1955), p. 66.
52) Bolton, pp. 219-220.
53) Kaye, p. 79.
54) Watson"p. 18.
55) Watson, p. 26-27.
56) Watson, pp. 28-29.
57) Watson, p. 44.
58) Herman Bavinck, Our Reasonable Faith (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1977), pp. 473, 476.
59) Bavinck, p. 479.
60) Bavinck, pp. 480, 481.
61) Bavinck, p. 480.
62) Bavinck, p. 481.
63) Bavinck, p. 483.
64) Bavinck, p. 486.
65) Bavinck, p. 489.
66) Kaye, pp. 84-85.
67) Bavinck, p. 482.
68) Ridderbos, p. 286.
69) Ridderbos, p. 254.
70) Ridderbos, p. 259.
71) Ridderbos, p. 260.
72) Ridderbos, p. 265.
73) Ridderbos, p. 275.
74) Ridderbos, p. 278.
75) Ridderbos, p. 278.
76) Ridderbos, pp 281-282.
77) Ridderbos, p. 282.
78) Ridderbos, p. 283.
79) Ridderbos, p. 284.
80) Ridderbos, p. 284.
81) Ridderbos, p. 285.
82) Quoted by Bandstra, p. 92, note 79.
83) Ridderbos, p. 285.
84) Ridderbos, p. 286.
85) Ridderbos, p. 286.
86) Ridderbos, pp. 293, 294, 297.
87) L.S. Chafer, Systematic Theology , IV (Dallas Seminary Press, 1948), p. 154.
88) Chafer, p. 155.
89) Chafer, p. 169; pp. 183, 203.
90) Chafer, p. 167.
91) Chafer, pp. 167-168.
92) Chafer, p. 24.
93) Jon Zens, Dispensationalism: A Reformed Inquiry into its Leading Figures and Features (Nutley, New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1978), pp. 25-39.
94) Chafer, p. 155.
95) Chafer, p. 204.
96) Chafer,.p. 168.
97) Chafer, p. 180.
98) Chafer, p. 160.
99) Chafer, p. 177.
100) Chafer, p. 244.
101) Chafer, p. 178.
102) Chafer, pp. 167-168.
103) Chafer, pp. 155, 169, 177, 212, 216, 219, 220, 214.
104) Chafer, pp. 177-178.
105) Chafer, pp. 177, 224.
106) Chafer, p. 177.
107) Chafer, p. 216.
108) Chafer, p. 241.
109) Chafer, p. 208.
110) Greg Bahnsen, Theonomy in Christian Ethics (Nutley, New Jersey: Craig Press, 1975), pp. 34-35, 44.