A particular but obscure dogma called antinomianism has emanated from the Reformation alongside federalism. Though it has never been associated with a confession or particular church, it has a lengthy and varied past. What is antinomianism? Why does it need to be defined? Its history and definition will answer the latter question, and its continued presence in theological discussion merits its identification. The answer to the former question begins with the occurrence of that doctrine called antinomianism in Reformation history. Antinomianism, to be properly defined, must first be accounted for as an element of the Reformation’s theological outgrowth. The term antinomian was not a term chosen by those of this designation; rather, their opponents placed it upon them. Much like the term amillennialist, it is often neither preferred nor truly descriptive of those placed under its designation. History, though, has necessitated its use. The word antinomian is a transliteration of the Greek word for law, nomos, and the prefix anti. It literally is said to designate a person thought to be against the law. Gertrude Huehns wrote, “The Oxford Dictionary defines an antinomian as ‘one who maintains that the moral law is not binding upon Christians under the law of grace.’” [1] As the next chapter will discuss, this definition set forth by Gertrude Huehns is not exhaustive or entirely accurate, but it will provide a suitable identification of the movement for the moment. From Luther onward, the word has been applied to every shade and form of aberrant group, often appropriate, but at times misplaced.
The first step in identifying that theology labeled antinomian is to separate into groups those who have been variously lumped together under that term. Antinomianism, though never a confessional movement or a movement constrained to a particular historical church movement, is as much a part of the Reformation as was federal theology. Antinomianism is as old as the Reformation itself, if not older. Certain authors, like Gertrude Huehns trace it as far back as the Marcionites and Montanists of the early church. Like federal theology, the traits of antinomianism can be traced through the history of Christendom as far back as Marcion or even Paul himself. As a distinct historical phenomenon, however, antinomianism does not properly find itself historically affirmed until the days of Martin Luther. It can be identified as a doctrine that grew up alongside federalism, having its roots in the Reformation. Since Luther was the first to use the term (and did so designating a companion of his own as the first thusly called), antinomianism is best seen as birthed from the designation of Luther.
One might argue which is older, federalism or antinomianism, and if federalism did not exist in form until the middle to late 16th century, then antinomianism is the older of the two. It predates federalism because the earliest Reformation doctrine next to sola Scriptura is sola fide. Before federalism sought to reconcile divine sovereignty with personal responsibility, Luther was defining the Christian life as simul iustus est et peccatur ("he is at the same time justified and yet a sinner"). It is this theological designation that appears most often to be the root of antinomianism tendencies. Luther himself was the first to use the term antinomian and it was applied to an associate of his in Eisleben. Remarkably, in some of Luther’s early statements, he might have been rightly dubbed an antinomian, yet it is his close associate that bears the distinction as the first antinomian. Daniel Steele wrote of the rise of antinomianism:
Its full development, since the Reformation, is due to John Agricola (1492-1566), one of the early coadjutors of Luther [. . .] he published in 1537 these words: "Art thou steeped in sin – an adulterer or thief? If thou believest, thou art in salvation. All who follow Moses must go to the devil; to the gallows with Moses [. . .]. Luther attacked him violently, calling him a fanatic, and other hard names. [2]
The early date of Agricola’s words and doctrine predate the rise of federalism but are by nature antagonistic to federalism.
Antinomianism traces its roots from Luther’s early theology. One can observe the irony in Luther’s own remarks in reaction to Agricola. Later in life Luther would draw back and reinstate the use and necessity of the law in the believer’s life, as circumstance and situation warranted. It is understandable that antinomianism would first arise, as a child of the Reformation, alongside Lutheranism, as Luther’s early emphasis upon the relationship of men to God in salvation stressed a stark contrast between law and grace. Huehns wrote, “Torn between these contradictory notions, it took Luther a long time, and assiduous reminding by the temporal authorities, before he was ready to realize that ‘whoever stops teaching the doctrine of the Law, dissolves all civil and domestic government […].’” [3] The first antinomian controversy erupted perhaps from Luther’s own doctrine itself, where a follower of his took the often-extreme statements of Luther and formulated a particular view of law and grace. Agricola, though, was no Libertine (a practicing antinomian); it is understood that his view of the sinner as free from the law did not lead to licentiousness. Luther drew back from Agricola because he viewed such dogma as dangerous.
Wherever the Reformation doctrine flourished, it met with its brother antinomianism. Steele identifies Amsdorf and Otto as the successors of Agricola, noting that they maintained “that good works are an obstacle to salvation.” [4] Here is seen the logical conclusion that the law is antithetical to grace and works to faith. It is congruous to statements from Luther such as: “good works come out of faith.” [5] As Luther drew out the distinctive antithesis between law and grace, the question of lawlessness was raised. Calvin was not ignorant of the tendency amongst the teachings of the Reformers to foster an antinomian spirit, as he wrote, “For, as soon as Christian freedom is mentioned, either passions boil or wild tumults rise unless these wanton spirits are opposed in time, who otherwise most wickedly corrupt the best things. Some, on the pretext of this freedom, shake off all obedience towards God and break out into unbridled license.” [6] Calvin was speaking more of the Libertines of his association than the more chaste expressions of Agricola. There were some who took the naked statements about Christian freedom and truly developed a lawless practice. Apparently Calvin himself was not untouched by that which Luther faced in Agricola. John Dillenberger wrote:
In the decade preceding the appearance of Servetus in Geneva in 1553, Calvin had frequent encounters with a series of fairly prominent individuals in Geneva on moral issues [. . .]. They belonged to an increasing number known as the Libertines, who in 1537 challenged the Council of Two Hundred, and who in a threatening episode, were quieted by Calvin as he rushed headlong into the armed crowd. [7]
On both fronts, first in Germany and then Geneva, antinomianism was an early issue in Reformation history. Between Luther and the antinomians, and in Geneva between Calvin and the Libertines, the reformers were engaged in battles against what they viewed as an extreme and excess view of Christian liberty. They were struggling to define the Christian life, as it relates to God, as one of dutiful obedience contrary to the extreme position that defined the Christian’s obedience as irrelevant.
One must understand the historical climate of the day of Luther and Calvin; these debates were not simply theological in nature, but actually dealt with ecclesiastical affairs in the church. Dillenberger notes, “in Calvin’s Geneva the moral issues involved both government and church, sometimes in alliance, sometimes in opposition.” [8] The issue came to a head in the matter of Servetus, a theologian and condemned heretic, who took up the Libertine cause. Dillenberger notes, “For the most part, the opposition to Calvin was less interested in repudiating him as such or in supporting Servetus than it was in establishing its own freedom of life and morals.” [9] Against Servetus and Libertines, Calvin wrote, “Nor can any man rightly infer from this that the law is superfluous for believers, since it does not stop teaching and exhorting them to good, even though before God’s judgement seat it has no place in their consciences.” [10] The case of Servetus is involved and there is some indication that he used the Libertine cause for ill gain. Nonetheless, the tension of defining the Christian’s relationship to God abounded. At the heart of the disagreement between Luther and the antinomians and Calvin and the Libertines was the fundamental question federalism would answer: "What is the relationship between God and men?"
A Libertine, historically, was a man that would answer yes to Paul’s words "shall we continue in sin that grace may abound?" Those who bore the title antinomian in the 16th and 17th centuries did not necessarily in practice resemble such men. The Libertines Luther and Calvin disputed are not exactly the same as the antinomians that federalism protested in the 17th century. The Familists of Anne Hutchinson’s time are not the same as the Plymouth Brethren of John Nelson Darby’s day. Two distinct groups are identified: those rightly called Libertines, who would define the Christian’s obedience as irrelevant and sin as surreal, and those so-called antinomians. Antinomianism, if the word is to be employed in its historical form, needs to be defined much as federal theology was defined in the previous section. It must first be presented as a historical phenomenon. It must be understood in its relationship to the Reformation and then identified through its various stages and manifestations. As there are different forms of federalism answering to one single presupposition, so there are different forms of antinomianism answering to one single presupposition.
The early reformers laid the groundwork for the continuing disputes with antinomianism that would prevail through the life of the Reformation. Antinomianism, much like an unwanted brother, followed the Reformation beyond the continent in its various formulations. Seventeenth century England was immersed in its own Antinomian controversy. Following the disputes of the magisterial reformers, the next notable movement of antinomianism arose in England in the days preceding the Westminster Assembly. Whereas on the continent the issue appeared to center upon government, ecclesiastical authority, and immoral practice, in England the discussion took on a different form. Antinomianism of the 17th century was chiefly concerned with the issue of assurance and was more a theological discussion of merit. Libertines and such were still prevalent in England, but there was a distinct difference between those fanatics and those called antinomians. Antinomianism took on some degree of respectability in the 17th century. This was predominantly due to the fact that, much like Agricola, reputable men raised the issue of antinomianism. While federalism was growing up, so was antinomianism. The different form of 17th century antinomianism was its understanding of the issues.
At the heart of 16th century antinomianism had been the question of moral practice. In the 17th century the debate shifted to the question of works as evidential of salvation. It was the natural and logical question posed by antinomianism in light of the rise of federal theology. Antinomianism of the 17th century, after the assaults of the magisterial reformers upon the extremities of Agricola and the Libertines, softened its harsh edges and moved toward a more acceptable position nearer the early reformers. The great disputes between the antinomians of the 17th century and the federal theologians would not center upon the question of moral practice but more on the issue of assurance. Steele wrote, “John Eaton (1575? -1642?), John Traske (d. 1636?), and Tobias Crisp (1600-1643), warrant introduction here, as illustrating comparatively radical approaches to the problem of assurance that were current in England around 1635 [. . .].” [11] The question changed between the 16th and 17th century. In the 16th century the question centered more upon the understanding of justification and how a man relates to God, as by faith alone. In the 17th century the question centered more upon the matter of sanctification, the use of works as evidential in one’s assurance, and the matter of impulse for obedience. It has not been shown that there was theological dependence by the Antinomians of the 17th century upon the antinomians of the 16th century; rather, it appears that wherever the doctrines of the Reformation were taught there was a tension in defining the motive and scope of Christian living. One might say the 16th century theologians were the champions of doctrine, answering the question of how men relate to God, while the 17th century theologians were champions of practice, answering the question of how men relate to God regarding assurance and sanctification. While this is not absolute, federalism did give rise to an emphasis upon piety that gave rise to the questions asked by the antinomians. Some moved toward a more legal position and some moved closer to a position of liberty.
Antinomianism was an established term by the days of Crisp, Eaton, and Traske. Tobias Crisp speaks to the tension in his day:
It is true, I confess, this word liberty, hath gotten an ill name in the world, partly through the abuse of liberty, and partly through the malignity of some spirits, that strike even at the heart of Christ, through the sides of those that are Christ’s; laying reproachful, ignominious, and shameful names, upon them of libertinism. [12]
John Gill wrote this defense of Tobias Crisp:
[. . .] being far from pride, vanity, and self-conceitedness, and full of meekness, lowliness, and tender-heartedness; whereby it appeared, that the gospel of Christ had a very great influence upon his soul, and which engaged him to preach it freely [. . .] but reproach and persecution, his doctrine being falsely charged with Antinomianism [. . .].” [13]
The Antinomianism of the 17th century was different from the antinomianism of the mid-16th century. Much like federalism grew out of the early disputes between the reformers with the Libertines and antinomians, so did antinomianism grow up and mature through the years. The reformers had rightly answered the immoral designs of the early Libertines who sought liberty for the sake of licentiousness, but that victory did not settle the question of how men are to relate to God. Is the Christian life a legal relationship or free, or is it a combination of both? The question would continue to be asked.
Antinomianism was not necessarily Libertinism. Many so-called antinomians were moral, pietistic, and godly. Stoever said, “it was possible, however, to hold antinomian doctrines without in practice committing or condoning moral excess, and not everyone might technically be labeled ‘antinomian’ ended in libertinism.” [14] Tobias Crisp wrote, “But in this covenant of grace, to wit, the new covenant, it is far otherwise; there is not any condition in this covenant: mark what I say, and I beseech you hear me with an impartial and unprejudiced opinion.” [15] Here Crisp speaks to the heart of the 17th century antinomian debate with federalism, where the issue is not the liberty to be immoral, but rather, the issue of liberty from the covenant scheme of federalism. Aware of the charge of antinomianism, Crisp wrote in his sermon entitled No Licentious Doctrine:
[. . .] the freemen of Christ, when they transgress the law, as in all things they sin, yet when they sin, there is no curse, no menaces, no threatenings of the law to be executed upon them: should I come to instance, peradventure I should give offence to some; I would not willingly give offence to any; but the truth, as it is in Jesus, must not be concealed for fear of the anger of those that are enemies unto Christ [. . .]. [16]
It was well agreed upon by the antinomians of the 17th century that freedom in Christ did not mean freedom to sin, and only the extreme Libertarians could be accused of such. Yet this agreement did not put an end to the question of how a man relates to God.
The antinomianism of the 17th century was to some degree an intramural debate within federalism. Tobias Crisp said:
I am not ignorant, beloved, how this assertion goeth under the foul blur of Antinomianism, that blameless walking according to the law, being established, is a fruit of ignorance, and a cause of men’s not ‘submitting to the righteousness of God.’ And no marvel it goes for such now; for, in the apostle’s time it was accounted so; nay, it was objected against the apostle himself as direct Antinomianism: and, therefore, he was enforced to vindicate himself thus, ‘Do we then make void the law, (saith he) through faith? God forbid!’ He takes away the objection they put to him, upon his establishing of God’s righteousness, and his overthrowing our righteousness. It was objected, that hereby he went about to make void the law; and, therefore, it is no marvel it holds still as an objection, that the maintaining of this principle is the overthrowing of the law. But, beloved, I must say to you, as the apostle did in the same case, ‘God forbid! yea, we establish the law,’ that is to say, in its right place. [17]
Crisp’s point is clear: that which was called antinomianism in his day was not antinomianism. That is, the Libertine spirit of the day of Calvin and Luther that sought to use liberty for license was not what those called antinomians of the 17th century taught.
Thus it can be said that the antinomianism of the 17th century moved beyond the errors of the 16th century. Its statements were more guarded and informed. Early in the life of Puritan New England, there arose a controversy over antinomianism. John Cotton, a Puritan minister of Boston, was, in the middle to late 30’s of the 17th century, embroiled in what was called the Antinomian Controversy. Remembered most as the case involving Anne Hutchinson (a member of Cotton’s congregation who had followed his migration from England), it was the same issue that English Puritans were battling back home. Anne Hutchinson was brought to trial in New England for her disruption of New England life. She had been holding large meetings, instructing others in the way of Cotton’s preaching. There was a question of whether she was teaching men in those meetings and the content of the meetings. She was eventually accused of saying that John Cotton taught a covenant of grace and the other New England ministers a covenant of works. John Cotton was examined by his peers, as was Anne Hutchinson. John Cotton was exonerated, but Anne Hutchinson was disciplined out of the colonies. Banished, she made her way to Rhode Island, where the Puritan Roger Williams had moved after his controversy with the men of New England. A most informative gathering of source materials and the actual transcripts of the trial can be found in David Hall’s, The Antinomian Controversy 1636-1638: A Documentary History.
The antinomianism in the 17th century was far more discrete than that of the previous century. This is well attested to by the fact that Anne Hutchinson was able to openly debate with the New England court at length from the Scriptures, presenting them with no openly condemnable error. One has to question whether the antinomianism of the 17th century really was of the same tenor as the antinomianism of the 16th century. Yes, much of 16th century antinomianism was misrepresented, but this was often due to its brash infancy and to an often over-statement of its point. Much like federalism, there was a maturation of thought for antinomianism. It was no longer the brash child of Luther’s day willing to nail Moses to the tree, even though some of this sentiment still flourished in the 17th century, but it was mature and seeking to establish itself as a true and valid understanding of how men relate to God in light of the understanding of free grace and works. It stood against the federalist view of assurance and sanctification.
The antinomians of the 17th century taught full assurance, immediate upon the work of grace in regeneration. Unlike the federalists, they dichotomized the soul. The federalists taught that, in regeneration, a holy principle is implanted in the man where a new will and heart are given and are part of the man. Assurance was available, to a degree, upon regeneration but works were evidential, as sanctification was the operation of the holy principle of the man invoked by the Holy Spirit. This was the thought of antinomians such as Crisp, Eaton, and Traske. According to Stoever, “all three men treated regeneration as the divine power of Christ dwelling in the justified, yet in such a way that it remains separate from the individual’s corrupt human nature, which is not really regenerated at all." [18] As it fleshed itself out, there was a conscious end to sin in the regenerate. Again Stoever writes:
From God’s viewpoint there simply is no longer any sin in believers or in the church. On this ground Eaton firmly rejected the common Protestant notion that the justified are simultaneously sinners and righteous in God’s eyes. By implication, when the justified sin, they do so in their own ‘sense and apprehension,’ not in God’s sight, and faith consists either in suppressing such apprehension or in not being bothered by it. [19]
Such a conclusion was taken as a denial of the need and process of sanctification. From the federalist viewpoint, if a sinner is made righteous and assured of it instantaneously, there is no need to concern oneself over sin or obedience after that point. It was believed that God sees not our sins and we must not as well.
Accordingly, the disagreement between federalism and the antinomians of the 17th century was centered on the constitution of the soul and the matter of sanctification. Unlike the 16th century where antinomianism was that practice of outward licentiousness and a misuse of liberty, in the 17th century antinomianism was assessed as an inward licentiousness and misunderstanding of liberty. Consequently, such misunderstanding posed a threat to the Puritan mind. For if one were to separate the man and his part in the covenant from the process of godly vivification and mortification through the use of means, men would be given to licentiousness. Antinomianism put forth the idea that “Sanctification, accordingly, is not in the godly themselves as part of their nature but is properly and perfectly in Christ, who, as the ‘new creature,’ is in them.” [20] If the godly were removed from the equation and sanctification was taken outside of the man and if the man was taught to ignore his sin as irrelevant, there was, to the federalist, no remaining restraint for undue liberty in license. In other words, the antinomianism of the 17th century was no different in the mind of the federalist to the antinomianism of the 16th century, as both resulted in the same conclusion. According to the antinomian, God relates to the regenerate in Christ and the sinful body and man are of no great concern. Even though men like Agricola and Crisp would argue that grace and love, apart from law, were impetus enough, the charge would still be applied. Crisp wrote:
We have our justification, our peace, our salvation, only by the righteousness Christ hath done for us: but this doth not take away our obedience, nor our services, in respect of those ends for which such are now required of believers. We have yet several ends for duties and obedience, namely, That they may glorify God, and evidence our thankfulness, that they may be profitable to men, that they may be ordinances wherein to meet with God, to make good what he hath promised. [21]
What was done in the body was said to have no effect upon the eternal state of the soul, so a man needed not to concern himself with the law’s condemnation. At the heart of dispute in 17th century antinomianism was the resolution of the question of God’s relationship to men. Seventeenth Century antinomianism addressed the make-up of the soul, the use of law, and the impetus of action.
Clearly the antinomians of the 17th century did disagree with the charge of Libertinism. They would argue they were doing nothing more than teaching true grace and that the motivation for the soul was not abandoned. Huehns notes, “The antinomian contention was always that they would do all the law commanded – and even more.” [22] The antinomians would argue they had greater motivation and sense of the call of holiness. Stoever notes, “these men rejected the notion that created being could participate in the transcendent work of redemption and spiritual rebirth. As a result, they were forced to seek justification, and subjective awareness of it, in works of divine immediacy.” [23] This divine immediacy produced an assurance that led to holy living. For the federalist the importation of a holy habit was the supernatural work leading to greater holiness; it occurred in the man. For the antinomian, “Being thus redeemed, the antinomians found their moral obligation increased, and the gravity of any offense sharpened.” [24] The conclusion was: “Thus the new doctrine seemed to slight the merely mechanical justice of merit and reward and to lay stress rather on the good will of the soul confronted with the demands of the divine.” [25] In its simplest form, the antinomianism of the 17th century did not agree with the premise of federalism that God related to men in sanctification by human means. Motivation was also an issue; Antinomianism did not necessarily say a man was without law. Tobias Crisp said, “I do not say the law is absolutely abolished, but it is abolished in respect of the curse of it, to every person that is a free-man of Christ; so though such a man sin, the law hath no more to say to him than if he had not sinned.” [26] Crisp does not speak of sinning that good may abound; rather, he notes the proper end to salvation in obedience. The antinomian denial of the basic tenant of federal theology does not necessarily place them in the category of teachers of lawlessness.
As noted earlier in this chapter, while the controversy was raging in England, it was transplanted to the New World. The "Antinomian Controversy" arose in New England during the years 1636-38, at the same time English antinomianism was gaining popularity. As it was in England, the Antinomian Controversy of New England was an intramural federalist debate; it involved Puritans debating with Puritans. Anne Hutchinson affirmed the absoluteness of assurance as a consequence of the personal testimony of the Holy Spirit. In New England the controversy was short-lived, while in England the controversy raged for the length of the century. Its American counterpart was successfully snuffed out by the labors of the ministers of New England. One thing, though, is true: wherever federalism was found, wherever the Reformation progressed, questions regarding the soul, works, faith, and law, abounded. They were but an indication of the root question of how God relates to men. For some the federalist answer was insufficient.
It has been the general tendency of federalism to haphazardly lump together as antinomian all those in disagreement with the basic tenants of federalism. “Sedgwick for instance repeats it senselessly: ‘the whole rabble of Antinomians such as were the Manichees, the Marcionites, the Montanists, the Muscovites, the Anabaptists, the Socinians together with their offspring and followers the Antinomians, a generation of Libertines [. . .].” [27] Huehns also states, “This use of the term is even confirmed by the tolerant William Walwyn who lists ‘under the common nicknames (used) of purpose to make them odious to Authority and all sorts of men…Brownists, Anabaptists, Antinomians, Seekers and the like [. . .].’” [28] The names given antinomians of the 17th century were many: “the antisectarian commission of 1634 enumerates: ‘sundry sortes of separatists and novelists as namely – Brownists, Anabaptists, Arians, Traskites, Familists, and some sorts [. . .] Sensualists, Antinomians [. . .].” [29] The word antinomian was often a salvo fired at anyone who questioned the conclusions of federalism. Antinomianism grew up with a tarnished name.
The fervor of antinomianism appeared to dissipate after the rise and decline of the days of Cromwell as Lord Protectorate during the Puritan revolution in mid-seventeenth century England. With the decline in Puritanism and its piety, perhaps the tension between the two decreased. As the height of federalism was reached, antinomianism appeared to peak. As one declined, so did the other. Huehns notes, “the antinomian argument was carried on in the eighteenth century [. . .]. It lived on [. . .] as an egocentric or sentimental protest against the mechanistic tendencies of undiluted rationalism.” [30] Gerstner says, “In Scotland, the Sandemanians were antinomians with a vengeance. All so-called ‘good works’ were considered bad works.” [31]
The term antinomian did not die out with the 17th century. It was later associated with the Plymouth Brethren movement and today has been used to refer to dispensationalism. Daniel Steele said of the Plymouth Brethren, “Perfect holiness, with the Brethren, is one and the same with justification. It is, or was, a finished work of God. It is in no sense personal in ourselves, but in Christ, and accomplished when he died on the cross [. . .]. No sin committed by a justified person can in the least affect his justification.” [32] His identification of Plymouth Brethren speaks to the same issue of the 17th century. He notes, “In short, the creed of the Antinomian is this: I was justified when Christ died, and my faith is simply waking up to the fact that I have always been saved [. . .].” [33] He quotes another:
Rev. J. Fletcher says, "An Antinomian is a professor of Christianity, who is antinomos, against the law of Christ, as well as against the law of Moses. He allows Christ’s law to be a rule of life, but not a rule of judgment for believers, and thus he destroys the law at a stroke, as a law; it being evident that a rule by the personal observance or non-observance of which Christ’s subjects can never be acquitted or condemned, is not a law for them.” [34]
Steele produces the evidence linking John Nelson Darby, the father of dispensationalism, with the Plymouth Brethren. He notes, “We have heard Mr. Darby say that if any man had anything to do with the law of God, even to obey it, he was a sinner by that very act.” [35] Steele would declare:
[. . .] there is an exhortation to practical holiness in most of the writings of the Brethren, on this wise: "Be holy down here because ye are holy up there" (in Christ). "Strive to make your state correspond with your standing." Yet this motive to Christian purity is neutralized by the assurance the believer’s standing in Christ is eternal anyhow [. . .] ultimate salvation is certain. [36]
From the Plymouth Brethren to Darby to dispensationalism, the term antinomian has not gone out of vogue. Much in its wake, of late, has been the uproar over the Lordship Salvation debate. John Gerstner, in his book, Wrongly Dividing the Word of Truth, has a whole chapter entitled Dispensational Antinomianism. John Gerstner reaches the conclusion that “Dispensationalism clearly teaches Antinomianism.” [37] From Agricola to dispensationalism, a common thread of contiguous advancement alongside Reformation theology can be drawn in the formulation of that which is called antinomianism. It is inherently in disagreement with the basic tenants of federalism and, thus, is an entity all its own. In the next chapter a concise and exhaustive definition of antinomianism shall be set forth.
[1] Gertrude Huehns, Antinomianism in English History: With special reference to the period 1640-1660, (London: The Cresset Press, 1951), 11.
[2] Daniel Steele, A Substitute for Holiness or, Antinomianism Revived, (New York: Garland, 1984), 47.
[3] Huehns, 31, 32.
[4] Steele, 47.
[5] Martin Luther, Commentary on Romans, (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1954), xv.
[6] John Calvin, Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion: The Library of Christian Classics, XX, tr. Ford Lewis Battles, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960), 834.
[7] John Dillenberger ed., John Calvin: Selections from his Writings, (Scholars Press, 1975), 7.
[8] Ibid., 6.
[9] Ibid., 7.
[10] John Calvin, 835.
[11] Steele, 138.
[12] Tobias Crisp, Christ Alone Exalted in the Perfection and Encouragement of the Saints, Notwithstanding Sins and Trials, being the Complete Works of Tobias Crisp, D.D., 1, (London: John Bennett, 1832), 122.
[13] Ibid., vi.
[14] Stoever, 162.
[15] Ibid., 86.
[16] Ibid., 130.
[17] Ibid., 143.
[18] Stoever, 139.
[19] Ibid., 140.
[20] Ibid., 143.
[21] Tobias Crisp, 134.
[22] Huehns, 12.
[23] Stoever, 147.
[24] Huehns, 13.
[25] Ibid., 14.
[26] Tobias Crisp, 132.
[27] Huehns, 37.
[28] Ibid., 37.
[29] Ibid., 66.
[30] Ibid., 171.
[31] John Gerstner, Wrongly Dividing the Word of Truth: A Critique of Dispensationalism, (Brentwood: Wolgemuth & Hyatt, 1991), 212.
[32] Daniel Steele, 17.
[33] Ibid., 35.
[34] Ibid., 31.
[35] Ibid., 58.
[36] Ibid., 79-80.
[37] John Gerstner, 230.